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ABSTRACT
This thesis begins with a discussion of the theoretical aspects of nuclear war
termination. Specifically, the objective of war termination, the requirements necessary
to meet that objective, and the unclassified guidance available on war termination. As
a more practical matter, the Soviet view of war termination is then covered. This is
followed by a discussion of the goals of the United States in the event of a nuclear
war and how those goals may change depending on the scenario. Finally, the surrender
of Japan at the end of World War n is analyzed as a case study to determine the
significant historical lessons which may be of value in the future. Particular attention
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I. INTRODUCTION TO WAR TERMINATION
The subjects of war termination and the political utility of nuclear weapons are
addressed in this thesis not because nuclear war is desirable or likely, but because the
potential for a nuclear war exists. As a result, the United States should consider the
possible results and the factors which could affect the outcome in an effort to ensure
the most favorable terms in any future war termination agreement.
A. OBJECTIVE
The United States objective for war termination is clearly described by Leon Sloss:
To end the war someone else is likely to have started, the United States must
work to persuade the enemy to change his mind and to terminate the conflict
short of achieving his original objectives. Thus, he must be forced to reassess
either the cost of pursuing the war or the prospects for success.'
The difficulty in meeting this objective is in determining the best method(s) to be
used to persuade the enemy to accept a cease-fire. In order to understand how this
objective could be achieved, several related topics must be discussed. First, a brief
defmition of nuclear war termination, then a determination of what guidance has been
provided for war termination over the last decade in the Defense Secretary's Ajinual
'Leon Sloss, "Flexible Targeting. Escalation Control, and U. S. Options," Ending
a Nuclear War: Are the Superpowers Prepared? , eds. Stephen J. Cimbala and Joseph
D. Douglass, Jr. (New York: Pergammon-Brassey's Intemational Defense Publishers,
1988), p. 2.
Report to the Congress. This will be followed with a discussion of the theoretical
requirements for war termination and factors affecting the success of the negotiations.
B. DEFINITION
At present, there is no accepted defmition of what is meant by war termination.
Some authors have provided definitions for their own work, but none have been widely
accepted.^ The concept of nuclear war termination is simple, the use of nuclear
weapons has been stopped; it does not imply that all conflicts have been resolved.
"War termination is a necessary but not sufficient condition for peace, since the
discontinuation of hostilities does not perforce include positive progress towards
peace."' War termination therefore, is one of the foundations for the establishment of
a peace agreement and peace itself.
For the purposes of this paper, nuclear war termination is defined as the cessation
(for any reason) of the use of all nuclear weapons; it is the transition from a state of
nuclear war to one of conventional war or non-war. Nuclear weapons may cease to
be used for several reasons: both nuclear arsenals are exhausted, the combatants reach
a mutual cease-fire agreement, one opponent accepts defeat, or both sides agree to
deescalate from a nuclear war to a conventional war. In any case, all of the remaining
^Herman Kahn, William Pfaff and Edmund Stillman, War Termination: Issues and
Concepts (New York: Hudson Institute, 1968), pp. 32-66; George H. Quester, "The
Difficult Logic of Terminating a Nuclear War," Strategic War Termination , ed. Stephen
J. Cimbala (New York: Piaegei Publishers, 1V86), p. 56; ajui SRI International
Strategic Studies Center, War Termination Concepts and Political, Economic and
Military Targeting (Arlington, Virginia: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
1978), p. 3.
'Michael 1. Handel, War Termination: A Critical Survey (Jerusalem. Israel: Alpha
Press, the Hebrew University of Jemsalem. 1978), p. 10.
nuclear weapons should be withheld by each side. In the event that an agreement were
reached which allowed the continued use of some types of nuclear weapons, such as
sub-kiloton nuclear artillery, the temptation to escalate would be much stronger than
if the original nuclear threshold were reestablished. By agreeing to deescalate to a
completely conventional war or to an end of hostilities, the combatants could return to
a more famUiar relationship. The conditions below the nuclear threshold will have
changed vastly, both sides may have been devastated and the nuclear balance will have
shifted to some unpredictable situation, but actions and responses are more clearly
understood below the nuclear threshold. Additionally, mistaken interpretations may be
less costly in a conventional war. It has been stated that all wars since World War
n involving nuclear capable countries (the United States since 1945, the Soviet Union
since 1947, etc.) have been nuclear wars, but that a nuclear option has only been used
once.* With this perspective in mind, the question arises, does the prevention of
crossing the nuclear threshold fall within the category of war termination or is war
termination limited to methods of reducing the conflict?
In Western nuclear theory the limitation of deliberate or inadvertent growth in the
scope of destruction of a conflict has traditionally been referred to as escalation control.
The ability to impose escalation control at each and every level of the escalation ladder
has been referred to as escalation dominance.' A contemporary view of escalation
*James John Tritten, "Are Nuclear and Non-nuclear War Related?," The Journal
of Strategic Studies
.
11 (Sep. 1988), pp. 371, 372.
'Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (New York: Frederick
A. Praeger, 1965), pp. 3-9.
dominance is that "the defending NATO forces are adequate to deny the Warsaw Pact
any quick victory without NATO resort[ing] to nuclear weapons."* With these two
perspectives in mind, it is clear that preventing escalation does not fall within the
purview of war termination. Although escalation control/dominance is not a
component of war termination it must be pointed out that these two concepts are
related. The abUity of one of the combatants to control the level of destruction would
greatly enhance that sides bargaining position in any war termination efforts.
C. GUIDANCE
In the event that a nuclear war has become unavoidable and the threat of retaliation
has proven insufficient to deter the Soviets from an attack, the United States is
expected to ride out the initial attack and then counter-attack with a measured response.
Often the discussion of the war ends at this point. Before continuing, it is important
for the reader to note that the Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense is not a war-
fighting document, but a programming document. TTierefore, it is possible that there
is no relationship between its guidance and that of the classified war-fighting
documents. In order to prevent classification of this thesis, these reports will be used
and will be considered to at least be consistent with the intention of the actual
guidance on war termination. The last ten years statements by the Secretary of
Defense as recorded in his Annual Reports to the Congress are organized below:
1981 Brown "— to hold the elements of a reserve force
for a substantial period after a strategic
exchange." p. 6; also listed
*Cimbala, Nuclear War and Nuclear Strategy: Unfinished Business (New York:








"Finally in the event deterrence faUs, our
forces must be capable., of preventing
Soviet victory and securmg the most
favorable possible outcome for U.S.
interests." p. 68.
"should deterrence fail, to deny the
aggressor its objectives or to retaliate so as
to prevent it from gaining more than it
would lose at any level of conflict..." p. 29.
"to impose termination of a major war—on
terms favorable to the United States and
our allies—even if nuclear weapons have
been used—and in particular to deter
escalation in the level of hostilities;" p. I-
18.
"In the event of an attack, to deny the
enemy his objectives and bring a rapid end
to the conflict on terms favorable to our
interests; and to maintain the political and
territorial integrity of the United States and
its allies." p. 16.
"so that we might terminate the conflict on
terms favorable to the forces of freedom,
and reestablish deterrence at the lowest
possible level of violence, thus avoiding
further destruction." p. 29.
"Should deterrence fail, to seek the earliest
termination of conflict on terms favorable
to the United States, our allies, and our
national security objectives, while seeking
to limit the scope and intensity of the
conflict." p. 25.
"but if deterrence fails, by fighting to
restore the peace." p. 3.^.
"should deterrence fail, by defeating the
armed aggression and ending the conflict
on terms favorable to the United States, our
allies, and our interests at the lowest
possible level of hostilities." p. 42.
1989 Carlucci "should deterrence fail, by defeating the
armed aggression and ending the conflict
on terms favorable to the United States, its
allies, and interests at the lowest possible
level of hostilities." p. 45.
1990 Carlucci "should deterrence fail, by defeating armed
aggression and ending hostilities on terms
favorable to the United States and its
allies." p. 34.
There are two major themes and several less consistent themes in these statements
which should be pointed out. First, the nuclear reserve force is to provide for a peace
settlement which is more favorable to the United States than the Soviet Union. This
theme appears in eight of the ten statements. This clearly recognizes that there wUl
not be a "winner" in the sense of imposing an unconditional surrender upon a "loser."
Instead the guidance recognizes that generous peace terms (far short of unconditional
surrender) may be necessary to end a nuclear war. In this event, the terms should be
such that they benefit the United States more than the Soviet Union. The necessity for
a conditional surrender will become clearer after reviewing the requirements for nuclear
war termination. The second major theme (listed in five of the ten years) is to limit
the escalation to the lowest possible level. The NRF would be used to establish what
is commonly called intra-war deterrence which means that having failed to persuade
the enemy not to escalate, the threatened use of nuclear weapons is now used to
compel the enemy to stop attacking. TTie change in concepts is subtle but important.
Deterrence is "a threat made passively to persuade the other to remain passive,"
whereas intra-war deterrence or compellance is a threat "made actively to stop the other
[from] being active."' This is generally done through coercion, threatening the
destniction of a highly valued item of the enemy." Tliere aie tliree less frequent
themes in the statements of the last ten years. The first is that the United States will
defeat armed aggression. This concept has only appeared in the three most recent
years. Second, is the theme that the United States will deny the enemy his objectives.
This theme has appeared only twice and not since FY 1984. Finally, the idea that the
United States will seek a rapid end to the conflict has also been stated twice.
D. REQUIREMENTS
Several academics have listed the assets that they consider necessary for the United
States, the Soviet Union and in some cases the NATO allies to possess for successful
nuclear war termination. Below is a list of items drawn from four sources and
organized into three categories.' TTiese requirements assume that there is no "winner"
in which case the nuclear war wUl most likely be terminated by negotiations.
'Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1981), p. 222.
'Cimbala, Nuclear War and Nuclear Strategy
, p. 80.
'Sloss, pp. 3, 4; Robert G. Leahy. "The Mechanics of War Termination," Ending
a Nuclear War: Are the Superpowers Prepared? , eds. Stephen J. Cimbala and Joseph
D. Douglass, Jr. (New York: Pergammon-Brassey's International Deferise Publishers,
1988), pp. 91-94, 127, 182; Barry R. Schneider, "War Tennination for Strategic Nuclear
Conflicts," Strategic War Termination (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1986), p. 129;
Clark C. Abt, A Strategy for Terminating a Nuclear War (Boulder Colorado: Westview
Press Inc., 1985). p. 142.
1. Personnel
a. A Legitimate Leader
An authenticated (recognized) national level command authority must
survive in each nation. In the United States, Presidential succession is provided for by
several legal documents: the 25* Amendment to the Constitution, the 1947 Presidential
Succession Act (61 Stat. 380) and United States Code, Annotated, Title 3, Section 19.
The succession starts with the Vice President and in the event of simultaneous
vacancies in the offices of the President and the Vice President, the national leadership
then passes first to the Speaker of the House, then to the President pro tempore of the
Senate followed by the Cabinet officers in the order in which their offices were
established.'"
In the event of certain dire military emergencies when the normal chain
of command cannot be followed and immediate decisions are required by the National
Command Authority (NCA), nuclear weapons release authority, goes from the President
to the Secretary of Defense and then if necessary to military commanders in the field
until a Cabinet member or other legitimate authority can be located. This delegation
of the NCA is authorized by the National Security Act and delineated in a classified
document known as the National Command Authority. It is endorsed by each President
at the beginning of his tenure."
"T^onald C. Moe. Presidential Success ion: A Short Histor\' (L,ibrnr\' of Congress,
Congressional Research Service Report No. 78-244 GUV, 1979), pp. CRS-1, 2.
"National Security Policy: Conflict over Control
.
Issue Brief No. 81086, Jul. 5,
1981, p. 7, and Stewart W. Taylor, Jr., "Disabling of Reagan Provokes a Debate over
Nuclear Authority in Such Cases," New York Times , Apr. 4, 1981, p. 9; as cited by
Stephen W. Stathis, "Presidential Disability Agreements Prior to the 25'*' Amendment,"
What would the United States NCA do in the event that a Soviet leader
could not be authenticated, but there existed one or more non-recognized officials who
demonstrated the they were in control of the remaining Soviet nuclear weapons? TTiis
question is not addressed by the academics and the answer is unclear. It is possible
that the United States would negotiate with such individuals in an effort to end the
nuclear strikes. It is equally possible that they could be viewed as illegitimate leaders
who are in control of some nuclear weapons, but not enough to put them in control
of the Soviet Union and therefore, they would not be qualified to be spokesmen or
representatives of the Soviet people or the Communist Party.
b. Pragmatic Political Leaders
The political leaders that survive must be pragmatic and prevail over
zealous war hawks, because historically the zealots cannot end a war once it has begun.
A pragmatic leader is more likely to be able to objectively assess the situation, open
negotiations, and reach a settlement. This capability has often eluded zealots caught
up in conflicts throughout history. This point is discussed in great detail by Fred C.
Ikl6 in Every War Must End .
2. Hardware
a. A Nuclear Reser\'e Force
In theory, a survivable and enduring nuclear reserve should be retained
after a major attack to hold at risk those assets the enemy values most highly to
effectively threaten their destruction and cause him to cease his offensive operations.
Presidential Smdies Quanerlv . 12 (Spring 1982), p. 212.
Furthermore, these forces should consist of some weapons from each leg of the TRIAD
to provide flexibility to the NCA in accomplishing this task. Realistically, this may
or may not happen. This would prevent limiting a United States response to counter-
value (primarily cities and civilians) targeting or any other single solution.
The reserve force should also be of sufficient size to prevent successful
coercion by all enemies. If the enemies have retained a larger and qualitatively better
reserve force than the United States, their bargaining position could be significantly
better than that of the United States. It is therefore important to have a comparable
reserve force both in size and quality.
b. Command Centers
Command centers must survive to provide a location for the evaluation
of damage reports, intelligence estimates, and threat assessments. These centers will
provide the NCA with the best data available on the condition of the nation and the
status of the war. The NCA should also be able to coordinate his military,
intelligence, and diplomatic assets from this location. Finally, these centers will provide
an area for decision makers to develop and evaluate a strategy to bring the conflict to
an end.
c. Communications Capability
Retention of communications capability is also vital to the success of
any war termination effort. The NCA must be capable of communicating with the
enemy to have an opportunity to establish a cease-fire. He must maintain
communications with his own nuclear forces to maintain control and prevent actions
which could be misinterpreted as hostile and escalatory in nature. This would also
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allow for a verification of control over surviving forces. Since the United States does
not intend to fight the war alone, consultation with allies would also be necessary to
present a coordinated and cohesive response to any proposed peace agreement. Finally,
the NCA must be able to inform the populace of his action, reassure them that every
effort is being made to end the war and restore the peace. Communications will also
be needed to provide information on relief efforts that are under way to provide the
victims with assistance.
d. Sensors
The final hardware requirement falls into the category of warning and
assessment capability. The NCA must have the sensors necessary: to assess damage
around the world, to continue monitoring for another attack and provide warning, and
to gather intelligence on enemy communications, plans and actions. TTie information
provided by these sensors would allow for the evaluation of the enemy's capabilities
and enhance the United States' bargaining position. Following a major nuclear strike
the requirements for warning and assessment will be reduced. The requirements for
detection will be less stringent because the knowledge that the attacks have stopped or
are continuing wUl be more important to the establishment and monitoring of a cease-
fire then the warning of where the warheads are targeted.'^ Is it likely that sufficient
warning sensors will survive? The answer is probably yes, because enough of them




assessment sensors may be another matter. They provide only the size and location
of the detonations and this is fed into a computer program to determine what assets
were destroyed and the amount of damage inflicted to the surrounding area.'* These
computers would not be expected to survive this attack.
Can the United States accept such uncertainties when ending a war?
An agreement can always be reached, but the more information available to the United
States negotiators, the less likely they wUl be bluffed or forced into accepting
unfavorable terms. Likewise, the information could be used to the Soviets disadvantage
in order to reach an agreement more favorable to the United States.
3. Diplomatic Requirements
a. Enemy Authentication
One of the primary functions of the diplomats working on the
establishment of a cease-fu'e (or a more enduring peace agreement) wUl be for them
to determine the authenticity of the enemies leaders and negotiators. Tiiey must verify
that the individuals they are going to negotiate with are in fact the legitimate
representatives of the USSR and that they are in control of all Soviet nuclear weapons
in their arsenal. In the event that a legitimate Soviet leader is authenticated while an
illegitimate leader is determined to be in control of some or all of the Soviet nuclear
reserve force (NRF), how should the United States respond? Again the answer is
unclear, and will probably vary with the scenario. The United States response may
'*Leahy, p. 126.
12
21onghinge on several factors such as demonstrated power of the individuals,
international pressure to end the war, or internal support or dissent.
b. Verification
Once an agreement has been reached, it will be the job of the diplomats
to ensure the cease-fire measures are being implemented and to clarify
misunderstandings which could undermine the continued success of the agreement.
Once a cease-fire has been successfully established, the diplomats will have to negotiate
and conclude a long term peace settlement. Provisions of this agreement wUl also
require diplomatic verification. The success or failure of the negotiations will dep)end
on several key factors discussed below.
E. FACTORS AFFECTING THE SUCCESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
1. Positive Control
Successful wartime efforts to establish a cease-fire will hinge on both sides
demonstrating positive control of their respective nuclear arsenals. Positive control will
be necessary because each side will be very wary of the opponent and his intentions.
Negative control, demonstrating the abOity to prevent the continuation of nuclear
strikes, is unlikely to provide either side with satisfactory proof of control.
Demonstrating positive control can be accomplished in several ways. The most likely
is that each side will demand that their opponent launch a specific type of weapon or
a weapon from a specific ICBM field to an acceptable location, possibly mid-ocean.
This will not only demonstrate positive control, but also show good faith by expending
some of the remaining nuclear weapons. Positive control does not imply all nuclear
strikes will cease. It may be perceived to be in the best interest of either or both
13
nations to continue selective strikes during the negotiations to enhance their credibility
or to demonstrate their willingness to carry out threats which would make deterrence
more effective in the future." These strikes do not necessarily have to be strategic in
nature, but could be conducted at the operational or tactical level. It is possible that
if the negotiations are progressing, such strikes could be used to demonstrate
deescalation (decrease from strategic attacks to theater attacks). By continuing to
attack, both sides will demonstrate their willingness and capability to retaliate in an
effort to enhance their enemies perception of them as possessing a credible deterrent.
2. National Will and Cohesion
A strong national will and cohesion both within the United States and among
its allies, would enhance the bargaining position of the United States. If the divisions
among the allies were minimized, and a coordinated international response was
prepared, the Warsaw Pact might be prevented from reaching multiple peace accords
which are not in the best interests of the NATO Alliance as a whole. Additionally,
differences among groups within the United States could weaken the perception of
United States negotiators as legitimate representatives of the nation and thereby weaken
the United States' bargaining position. By keeping the United States public informed




3. Willingness to Negotiate
If both sides can be made to feel that negotiating would be more beneficial
than continuing the war, then the discussion will have a much better chance of
producing an agreement that is acceptable to both parties and their allies. Public
pressure within the nations and by the international community could improve this
desire to negotiate and bring about a peace settlement.
4. Agreement
Finally, success in the negotiations will be much more likely to occur if both
sides can agree who won and who lost or that the war resulted in a standoff. If there
is a "winner" it would be in his own best interest to offer generous peace terms to the
"loser" out of respect for the damage the "loser's" nuclear reserve could inflict upon
the "winners" homeland. If the victor insisted upon the unconditional surrender of the
vanquished there would be no reason for the "loser" not to use the remaining nuclear
warheads prior to accepting such a surrender.
F. CONCLUSION
The goal of nuclear war termination for the United States is to persuade the enemy
to end the conflict without achieving his original objectives and on terms which are
more favorable to the United States than the Soviet Union. In order to accomplish
this, the United States must be able to meet the hardware, personnel, and diplomatic
requirements outlined above. While both national leaders are expected to have a
threatening nuclear reserve force to bargain with, the success of such negotiations will
depend on the wUlingness of each nation to negotiate and reach agreements, as well
15
as their national and alliance cohesion and ability to demonstrate positive control over
their respective nuclear reserves.
Up to this point, only Western concepts and theories of nuclear war termination
have been discussed. Since the Soviet Union has been perceived as the primary enemy
of the United States and is at present the only other nation with a nuclear arsenal
capable of threatening the existence of the United States, their views of war termination
must also be considered.
16
II. SOVIET VIEW OF WAR TERMINATION
A. INTRODUCTION
Having reviewed the Western theory of war termination it is appropriate to explore
the Soviets statements on how wars are terminated. To understand the Soviet point of
view, it is necessary to look at their statements on several topics. First, is the Soviet
theory of just war, because it provides insight into the political objectives which the
Soviets have historically said would lead the Soviet Union into a nuclear war. This
will be followed with the views of Soviet authors on the possible forms of nuclear war
(limited nuclear war, massive preemption or a decapitating strike). Finally, the question
of how do Soviet authors define "victory" and what is its application to war
termination?
The Soviets adopt much of their military doctrine from the writings of Clausewitz,
who asserts that "the degree of force that must be used against the enemy depends on
the scale of political demands on either side."'* An application of this to a modem day
nuclear war could be interpreted to read that a large scale nuclear war could only be
justified when the enemy's objective is the complete annihilation of your nation-state
as a sovereign political entity. American authors that believe this interpretation is
'*Carl von Clausewitz, On War , edited and translated by Michael Howard and
Peter Paret (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 585.
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correct, cite Soviet military authors that recommend a strategy which would result in
large scale nuclear strikes."
Following such a full scale global nuclear campaign by the Soviets, they could
use approximately two-thirds of their nuclear weapons. Deterrence would have failed
and both nations would have executed their major preplanned options. A state of war
would continue to exist between the United States and the Soviet Union. If either
nation were to use all of its nuclear weapons while its enemy withheld some small
portion of its arsenal, the withholding nation would be in a much better position to
force terms of surrender on its enemy. In order to prevent this type of coercion both
nations are expected to retain a portion of their arsenals (one-third is assumed here) as
a nuclear reserve force (NRF). The Soviets are expected to target intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) fields, long-range bomber bases, SSBN home ports, nuclear
weapons production and storage facilities, many military bases, key defense industries,
and politico-military command and control centers." The damage inflicted could reach
50% of the United States population and 75% of the industrial base."
"Cimbala, Nuclear War and Nuclear Strategy
, pp. 86-91.
"William Lee, "Soviet Nuclear Targeting Strategy and SALT." World Communism
at the Crossroads , ed. Steven Ro.sefiekle (Boston: Maitiiius Nijhoff l^iiMishing. 1980),
p. 57.
"K. V. Tarakanov, Matematika i vooruzhennaya bor'ba (Moscow: Voyenizdat,
1974), pp. 185-186; as cited by Graham T. Allison, Albert Camesale, and Joseph S.
Nye, Jr., Hawks, Doves and Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War (New York:
W.W. Norton & Company, 1985), p.l74.
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What can be inferred, from Soviet military doctrine and from other analyses, about
the Soviet NRF? What have Soviet authors historically said about how their NRF
would be utilized to stop the conflict?^
B. JUST vs. UNJUST WARS
Authors of Soviet doctrinal writings, prior to Gorbachev's climb to power, assert
that any military action undertaken in the defense of socialism or a liberation
movement is by definition a just war. Only "imperialist powers" are capable of
conducting aggressive wars.'' Therefore, a war is justified based on its social content
and political objectives, not on the basis of morality as in the West. Soviet
denunciations of unjust wars are a call for disarming the "imperialists," but do not
eliminate the Soviet capability to conduct just wars of similar scale and using similar
weapons.
Participation in such just wars will not necessarily limit the Soviets to defensive
battles. Their strategy claims (as does ours) that the best defense is a strong offense
and their taking the offensive in a just war is exactly what we should expect."
because of the present upheaval generated by glasnost, perestroika, and
democratization throughout every aspect of Soviet society, it is impossible to predict
with any certainty how Soviet Military Doctrine wUl change. As a result, this
interpretation wUl require review when Soviet society has stabilized.
^'A recent example is Colonel-General G. Sredin, "Marxist-Leninist Doctrine on
War and the Army," Strategic Military Review
. No. 10 (Oct. 1983), p. 7. Colonel-
General Sredin was the Chief of the Lenin Military-Political Academy in October,
1983.
"Ye. Rybkin, rev. of Bases of Marxist Leninist Teachings on War ^d the Army
,
by Major-General V. Serebryannikov (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1982); translated by the
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, JPRS 83924, p. 38; N. N. Azovtsev, V.I. Lenin
and Soviet Military Science (Moscow, 1981), p. 32; as cited by Mark E. Miller, Soviet
Strategy Power and Doctrine: The Quest for Superiority (Bethesda, Maryland: Advanced
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Soviet writings since 1986 assert that nuclear weapons have created a new way
of thinking which should have as its top priority, the survival of mankind.^ Clearly,
the Soviets do not want or intend to use nuclear weapons to establish the world-wide
Communist Utopia described by Marxist-Leninist ideology. An unrestricted nuclear war
is a dire last resort and will only occur if it is "forced" upon the Soviets." What then
is occurring in the Soviet Union and how will it alter their views on war and war
termination?
One view is that there is a social revolution underway which will be as significant
to the Soviet Union as the October Revolution." This has occurred because the Soviet
leadership experienced the reality that modem war depends heavily upon the industrial
base and the Soviet Union's industrial base has fallen behind. This implies that their
command economy cannot be sure of winning a war with their class enemies. Because
International Studies Institute, 1982), p. 210.
"Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World
(New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1987), pp. 140-149.
"Robert L. Amett, "Soviet Attitudes Towards Nuclear War: Do they really think
they can win?." The Journal of Strategic Studies , 2, No. 2 (Sep. 1979), pp. 175-177;
Stephen Meyer. "Would the Soviets Start a Nuclear War?," Washington Post . Dec. 4,
1981, p. 15; Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, "Soviets on Nuclear-War-Fighting," Problems of
Communism , 35, No. 4 (Jul.-Aug. 1986), pp. 68-79; Stephen J. Cimbala, Nuclear War
and Nuclear Strategy p. 67; Raymond L. Garthoff, "Conflict Termination in Soviet
Military Thought and Strategy." Conflict Termination and Military Strategy: Coercion,
Persuasion, and War , eds. Stephen J. Cimbaia and Keith A. Duiui (Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press. 1987), pp. 39, 40.
"This argument is based heavily on a paper prepared for the Director, Net
Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense, by Dr. Robert Bathurst, Some
Problems in Soviet-American War Termination: Cross/Cultural Asymmetries (Monterey,
Califomia: Naval Postgraduate School, 1988).
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this contradicts Marxist-Leninist doctrine, the present military doctrine is not expected
to survive.
An opposing view is put forth by Dr. Stephen J. Cimbala in his latest book,
Nuclear Endings: Stopping War on Time .^ He states that the United States has
misdiagnosed the problem. American leaders believe that the internal weaknesses of
the Soviet system, combined with aggressive U.S. prodding have rolled back Soviet
aggression around the world and these forces are now causing the Communist Party to
crumble. Dr. Cimbala claims that such beliefs are "folly in pursuit of myth.""
He points out several weaknesses in the p)erspective. First, the Kremlin knows
that such aggressive Western policies will only last untU the next election. Second, it
assumes that the Soviet leadership lacks legitimacy which he argues was established
in the 1970s by the conclusion of various East-West accords. Third. Gorbachev is only
a figurehead for the collective leadership of the Kremlin and therefore this personality
cult has been developed to manipulate the foreign press and public.
He recommends that the United States instead recognize the stability and continuity
of the Soviet regime and the implications that this has for the United States and other
class enemies.^* From this perspective the existence of capitalism is objectionable to
the Soviets. The implication is that capitalism is the "enemy," although not necessarily
a provocative enemy, and also that the Soviets will continue to attempt to defeat
^"Stephen J. Cimbala, Nuclear Endings: Stopping War on Time (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1989), pp. 125-131.
"Cimbala, Nuclear Endings , p. 129.
"Cimbala, Nuclear Endings
, p. 130.
capitalism, by means short of war. If for some unknown reason the Soviets cannot
avoid a war with the United States, "it is the duty of the Soviet armed forces to
prosecute that war.. .toward victory."^' This view reaches the conclusion that there is
no sweeping change underway in the Soviet military.
Clearly, these two perspectives are in opposition to one another. At present it is
difficult to see any significant shift in the Soviet force structure, but at the same time
it appears that there is a great deal of political fluctuation. It is possible that once
political stability returns, the military will be appropriately restructured. It is equally
possible that there will be only minor changes in the Soviet force structure
accompanied by a great deal of propaganda. At present the answer is unclear.
C. LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR
Many Western authors have written about a limited nuclear war, but the Soviets
seldom broach the topic. General of the Army, S. Ivanov, made reference to the
"theoretical" possibility of the superpowers utilizing selective nuclear strikes for the
"purposes of scaring one another."'" But in order to successfully scare the Soviets,
nuclear weapons would have to fall on their homeland, and any strike against the
U.S.S.R. is (by Soviet definition) a strategic attack. The announced Soviet response
to a strategic attack is very clear: their doctrine calls for a massive retaliation to gain
the initiative and victory. The best that can be expected would be an escalation to
"Cimbala, Nuclear Endings
, p. 131.
^'General of the Army, S. Ivanov, "Soviet MUitary Doctrine and Strategy,"
Voyennaya my si'
.
No. 5 (May 1969), p. 49. Ivanov was commandant of the General
Staff Academy from 1968 to 1973.
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general nuclear war; the worst would be a massive preemptive strike in an attempt to
defeat the United States prior to this escalation,
A possible exception would be a limited nuclear war in Europe which excludes
nuclear strikes against the U.S.S.R." In response to a Soviet offensive in Europe,
NATO doctrine calls for "a flexible and balanced range of appropriate responses,
conventional and nuclear, to all levels of aggression or threats of aggression."" Since
the NATO Alliance does not maintain a conventional force of sufficient size to defend
against a full-scale ground attack by the Warsaw Pact, NATO commanders would be
required to use tactical nuclear weapons to offset this asymmetry in conventional forces
and to defeat a Soviet offensive. As a result of such a war in Europe "between 2 and
20 million Europeans would be killed, with widespread damage to the economy of the
affected area and a high risk of 100 million dead if the war escalated to attacks on
cities."" Because of the NATO Alliance and the grave devastation that would occur,
any nuclear war in Europe, could easily escalate into a global war.
The technical capability to conduct a limited nuclear war is clearly available to
the Soviet leadership, but it is generally not discussed publicly by them.^ Two
possible reasons for this are: first, that the Kremlin may feel that public acceptance
might create a range of "safe" nuclear options for America's leadership; and second,
''Garthoff. p. 45.
"Freedman, p. 285.
"Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough?: Shaping the
Defense Program. 1961-1969 (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 128.
"^Desmond Ball, "Can Nuclear War Be Controlled?." Adelphi Papers
.
No. 169
(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981), p. 34.
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that these "safe" options would undermine deterrence by making their use more
acceptable to American political leaders." By publicly maintaining that a limited
nuclear war is unacceptable, the Soviets are keeping the nuclear threshold at a level
which minimizes the likelihood of deterrence failing. In the event it does fail, the
Soviets have a command and control structure adequate to implement limited options,
if they so desire.
D. MASSIVE PREEMPTION
The success of the massive German surprise attack on June 21, 1941, has not been
forgotten by the Politburo and they continue to ensure that it will never happen again.'*
As a result of this deep Soviet commitment to preventing another successful surprise
attack, the Soviets plan for a different type of war; a war which is defensive in nature,
but which uses offensive tactics to ensure the success of their defensive strategy.
Soviet descriptions of nuclear war postulate that all other means of conflict resolution
have failed and the indicators they use for strategic warning foretell the inevitability
of nuclear detonations on Russian soil. Having reached the undesirable conclusion that
an attack by the West is imminent and unavoidable, the Soviets would opt for
"Miller, p. 224.
^Nathan Leites, Soviet Style in War (Santa Monica. California: Rand Corporation,
1982), p. 374.
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preemption" to limit the damage to their homeland and to seize the initiative." Some
theoreticians claim that the Soviets no longer accept this as a part of their doctrine,
having made in 1982 a public commitment to no first use of nuclear weapons." But
those less trusting of the Soviets insist that they have only changed their vocabulary;
instead of using the term "preempt," the Soviets now intend to "repel," "abort,"
"forestall," or "frustrate" a surprise attack.*^
What has really happened? Has the leadership of the Soviet Union really forgone
the option of using nuclear weapons first or have their public pronouncements merely
become propaganda? Is this an effort to bring about public pressure in the West for
arms reductions? The answers remain undecided, but should be resolved not based
on Soviet speeches, but on Soviet actions. One must mm to the Soviet force structure
for a clearer picture about whether the new phraseology is merely a disguise for the
old doctrine of preemption.
The Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces consist primarily of ICBMs. TTie remainder of
their strategic forces are on SSBNs and long-range bombers, which maintain low alert
rates compared to United States strategic forces. The Soviet hard-target kill (HTK)
capability resides almost completely in their ICBMs. Since most Soviet ICBMs are
"UntO the 27* CPSU Congress in 1986. the Party Program included the two
following phrases: Should the imperialist aggressors nevertheless venture to start a
new world war, the peoples will im longer tolerate a system which drags them into
devastating wars, 'lliey will sweep impeiialism away ajid buiy il. Gui baches
,
p. 148.
"Garthoff, p. 43; Cimbala, Nuclear War and Nuclear Strategy
, p. 87.
"L.I. Brezhnev, "Brezhnev's Statement," New York Times
.
Jun. 16, 1982, p. A20.
'^'Miller, p. 212.
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presently in fmed locations, they are more easily targeted than SSBNs or bombers
which can be deployed. Therefore, in order to reduce the risk of losing their hard-
target "killers" and to gain the initiative during the initial stage of the war, it probably
remains the Kremlin's intention to launch their strategic arsenal first.
E. DECAPITATION
Would the Soviets aim to destroy the United States National Command Authority
(NCA) or its communications links with U.S. strategic forces to prevent retaliation
following a Soviet preemptive strike? Several pieces of information have been
provided by Soviet leaders. One Soviet source implies that the expertise of personnel
in high technology industries is a criteria for the selection or avoidance of that city as
a target.
In selecting any specific region as the target and determining the sequence of
nuclear strikes against it. ..it is important to study the relative importance of
specific regions (objectives) to the industrial production of the country,
especially...the relative im|X)rtance of the region as a population center of the
country, and especially as a source of qualified and scientific-technical
personnel....*'
It is widely supposed that among the principal targets of the Soviet Strategic Rocket
Forces are the centers of politico-military administration, command and control." The
selection of these two target sets is not so much a strategy of decapitation as a strategy
for damage limitation and victory. While these are among the principal targets listed
*'Colonel M. Shirokov, "The Question of Geographic Influences on the Military
and Economic Potential of Warring States," Voyennaya mysl'
.




by Marshal Krylov, this does not mean Soviet strategy is based upon successfully
decapitating the United States.*^ By destroying the NCA and diminishing the
effectiveness of the command and control systems, the Soviet intent would be to
minimize the U.S. ability to authorize a response and thereby reduce the effectiveness
of the retaliation.
It is generally thought by most Western authors that the Soviets have no desire to
conduct a nuclear war at any cost; but that if the capitalist forces were to decide to
unleash a nuclear war, the Soviets would feel fully justified in preempting with a first
strike in their own defense. The question arises: Do the Soviets really believe they can
win a nuclear war?
F. VICTORY
Soviet writers have both asserted and denied that "victory" could result from a
nuclear war. It is necessary to analyze the author, the occasion, and the audience to
appraise the authoritative weight of any Soviet statement. A compilation of the context
of some Soviet statements on victory would show that those who advocate victory in
a nuclear war generally are military leaders, while those who denounce such concepts
generally are political leaders. This division is probably best explained as follows:
Soviet military leaders can be cited arguing either side of the question whether
victory in nuclear war is possible. It is a contextually dependent answer,
however offered. If the writer is explaining the imperatives of Soviet ideology,
it is stated deductively that the superior Socialist system must prevail over the
decadent capitalist one. If, on the other hand, the writer or speaker is addressing
the destructiveness of nuclear weapons and modem war, the analysis is more




pessimistic about the outcomes. Soviet theoreticians at one and the same time
proclaim the inevitable victory of socialism and the devastation of nuclear wnr **
Many authors including those in the Department of Defense strongly disagree with
this interpretation.*' The 1988 edition of Soviet Military Power states:
Although recent Soviet statements appear to reject their previously held positions,
these cannot be accepted solely at face value, particularly in light of unabated
Soviet efforts to develop and deploy the forces necessary to support a nuclear-
war-winning strategy.**
If the Soviets believe they could win a nuclear war, several more questions must
be asked: How is victory defined? What is deterring the Soviets at present? And what
fruits of victory can the Soviets really expect to harvest? The Soviet military generally
defines victory as the attainment of the assigned political objectives. In the event of
a large scale nuclear war, Western authors exp)ect the Soviet objectives to be:
1. Defeat of the enemy forces and potential.
2. Seizure of Strategic Areas.
"Cimbala, Nuclear War and Nuclear Strategy
, p. 75. Cimbala's foomote gives
credit for the original explanation to Raymond L. Gaithoff, Detente and Confrontation:
American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Instinjte, 1985), p. 780.
*'For additional opposing views see MUler, pp. 186, 188, 195, 200, 201, 204, and
226; Lee, p. 57; Garthoff, pp. 43, 44; Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., and Amoretta M.
Hoeber, Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press,
1979), pp. 2, 3 and 5; Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., "Nuclear War Termination: Soviet
Style," Ending Nuclear War: Are the Superpowers Prepared? , eds. Stephen J. Cimbala
and Joseph D. Douglass, Jr. (New York: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense
Publishers, 1988), p. 29; and Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Contemporary Soviet Military
Policy," The Soviet Calculus of Nuclear War , eds. Roman Kolkowicz and Ellen Propper
Mickiewicz (Lexington, Massachusens: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Company,
1986), p. 29.
**Soviet Military Power (Washington, DC: L^S. Government Printing Office,
1988), p. 96.
28
3. Occupation and Control.
4. Ideological Conversion/^
G. CONCLUSION
The Soviets believe nuclear war with the United States should be avoided if at all
possible. They do not desire to go to war against the United States, but they
understand that the possibility exists. Even though the likelihood of war is very small,
logic tells them that they must be prepared to fight, and that means fighting to win.
While the potential for war between the United States and the Soviet Union is small,
it does not mean the Soviets have given up their appetite for the fruits of war. Much
of their language has changed, but their nuclear arsenal continues to grow. This is a
strong indication that there are no sweeping changes underway in the force structure,
or at the military-technical level of Soviet military doctrine.
In the event that the Soviets are unable to prevent a nuclear war, their military
leaders continue to focus on a nuclear-war-winning strategy which they claim will end
with a victory for the Socialist system. This is the only form of war termination the
Soviets write about.
With this understanding of the Soviet view of victory and war termination, a
Western view of these areas will be discussed next. If a nuclear war erupted, what
should be the goals of the United States? What would the goals be once a nuclear
war started? What negotiating conditions are completely unacceptable? These are vital
questions because the answers will provide a framework which will change the future
*^Douglass and Hoeber, pp. 14-31. An alternative set of objectives is provided
in Miller, pp. 186, 187.
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of the world. It would be the beginning of a new era in history, one which could lead
to a much more stable world order if it is properly arranged.
Clausewitz states that the military objective of any war is guided by its political
purpose which is to force the enemy to do the victor's will.** When all political and
diplomatic methods have failed, the only means of acconplishing this political purpose
is through combat. In order to reach this goal, Clausewitz lists 3 broad objectives to
be accomplished in war:
1. The enemy's forces must be destroyed (put in such a condition that they can
no longer carry on the fight),
2. The country must be occupied, and
3. The enemy's will must be broken (the enemy's government and its allies must
be driven to ask for peace, or the population must be made to submit).*'
These objectives are very close to the Soviet's goals in victory, but the United




III. U.S. NATIONAL GOALS IN WAR TIME
A. INTRODUCTION
Both Western and Soviet views of war termination have been presented along with
the Soviet goals for a general nuclear war. This chapter will deal primarily with the
goals of the United States for the same situation. It will begin with what has been the
number one National Security Objective since they were first articulated in the fiscal
year 1986 Secretary of Defense Report to Congress. This is a broad statement of the
current national goal should war occur. The majority of the chapter will discuss what
the goals of the nation may become in the event of war. A set of goals is theorized
for each of three scenarios: the United States loses the war, the United States wins the
war, and finally both nations lose.
1. Contemporary National Security Objective
The primary national security objective is to:
safeguard the United States, its allies, and interests by deterring aggression and
coercion; and should deterrence fail, by defeating the armed aggression and
ending the conflict on terms favorable to the United States, its allies, and interests
at the lowest possible level of hostilities.*'
The failure of deterrence could lead to the type of global nuclear war referred to in
Chapter 2. The essence of our national defense strategy is to persuade potential
'^ Secretary of Defense Carlucci, Fiscal Year 1989 Annual Report to Congress
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 45. This document
is primarily a programming strategy, and as such is not a definitive source for war-
fighting goals. It is assumed that the goals listed by the Secretary of Defense in this
document for procurement are consistent with the national war-fighting goals.
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adversaries that the cost of their aggression will outweigh any possible benefit. This
is accomplished by deterrence through three methods:
1. Rewarding the aggressor for withholding his attack,
2. Denying the aggressor his objectives, and/or,
3. Punishing the aggressor with a retaliatory attack.
In the event that an enemy is not convinced that a Pyhrric victory is the only
possible result and launches a nuclear attack, the United States nuclear "strategy calls
for securing all United States and allied interests, denying the aggressor his war aims,
and causing or convincing him to stop his aggression.""
In order to ensure the success of deterrence, the preplanned nuclear options
of the United States are targeted at the assets believed to be most valuable to the
Soviet leadership and most useful for waging war. These assets are the Soviets
Strategic Rocket Forces, conventional forces, military-industrial complex, and
Communist Party leadership and control structures.
B. CHANGING GOALS
Once a general nuclear war has started, the goals will undoubtedly change to meet
the situation. Three possible situations will be discussed: The United States is




1. Scenario 1: United States Loses
If the United States is perceived as having lost this war with little or no
chance of altering the situation, then it can no longer justify continuation of the war
and must ask for a peace settlement. In this event, some aspects of American culture
must be preserved.
a. Maintaining the Political Tradition: Republican Form of Government
First among these ideals is the present form of government, a republic.
It is best described in the Declaration of Independence, "That to secure these
(unalienable) rights (life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness), governments are
instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed....""
Those in authority must continue to be subject to dismissal by the people for their
decisions, actions, or inactions. In order to maintain a responsive government, those
in a position of authority must be held accountable to those they govern. This does
not mean the bureaucratic structure will not change, quite the contrary, the needs of
the nation will most likely have changed drastically. Entire government departments
and agencies may have to be eliminated or reorganized to alleviate the new burdens
placed on the population. The most flexible and responsive political system capable
of accomplishing this task is a republic where those who set the national priorities for
recovery can be monitored by the majority. Since the demands on the government are
likely to be overwhelming and the resources available to meet those demands scarce.
"Declaration of Independence of the llnited States of America. Congress. July 4,
1776 and the Preamble of the Constitution which contains the most general and basic
objectives of the United States Government.
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the leadership will have to remain sensitive to the needs of those they are representing
while carefully rationing vital resources to rebuild the nation as rapidly as possible.
This will be an extremely delicate balancing act and exceptionally difficult to conduct
successfully.
b. Maintaining the Value System: The Bill of Rights
Having preserved national independence and a government in the form
of a republic, the next important aspect of the society requiring preservation is the Bill
of Rights. These rights include, freedom of assembly, speech, press, and religion, and
prevent unreasonable searches and seizures, double jeopardy for a single offense, self
incrimination and the taking of life, liberty or property without due process of law.
The Bill of Rights is not limited to the first ten amendments of the Constitution. It
also includes those civil liberties which provide equality to every individual regardless
of religion, race, age. or sex. These liberties and rights along with other freedoms are
central to the theme of individualism upon which America and the majority of the Free
World operates. Therefore, in any peace negotiations, the freedoms which nurture
individualism must be protected. A republic which lacks civil and human rights is not
a country in which individuals can realistically claim to be free. A republic, which
legitimizes (through laws or other means) discrimination, abuses civil rights or
eliminates the due process of law. is essentially a totalitarian state nm by an elite
group. In order to avoid elitist rule and to allow the United States to return to a
similar historical path, individualism and its supporting rights, liberties and freedoms
must be preserved and allowed to flourish.
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c. Maintaining the Economic System: Free Enterprise
Following a nuclear war, it has been postulated that a restoration race
will occur." In this race, those attacked in the war will begin rebuilding their military
as rapidly as possible, in order to minimize their vulnerability following the war. As
each nation restores its security forces it can then focus on rebuilding factories, farms
and homes.
Rebuilding factories, for both military and civilian sectors, will be most
efficiently accomplished by maintaining a free enterprise economy with some start up
subsidies for vital industries. Having a national heritage of initiative and persistence
and retaining the present "BUI of Rights," the logical system of economics to use for
this restoration race would be the free market system. It creates incentives for
individuals with imaginative ideas to provide new products or services. It allows
individuals and small companies to compete with large corporations and it minimizes
the number of unprofitable companies. It will allow individuals to propose different
paths for recovering different industries and wiU provide competition which should
eliminate the least efficient companies. These industries should be supported by
government subsidies only until the military has refortified and national security is
restored, after which subsidies should be ended.
"One such example is Michael Kennedy and Kevin N. Lewis. "On Keeping Them
Down; or, Why Do Recovery Models Recover So Fast?" Strategic Nuclear Targeting
,
eds. Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press,
1986), pp. 194-208.
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d. Maintaining the Resource Base
A full recovery for the United States will also depend on the peace
negotiators retaining sufficient elements of national power (geographic territory, raw
materials, populations, etc.) to operate the economic system. The United States will
need a great many materials to recover including coal, oil, steel, aluminum, lumber and
food. Initially it may be impossible to grow sufficient food or operate within certain
geographic areas. To compensate for this situation the United States will have to
obtain supplies from its allies and depend on the open market. In order to ship large
quantities the shipping and rail industries will be of vital importance. Air transport
will be necessary for time urgent shipments. Equally imponant, the United States will
require a large labor force to grow food where feasible, and operate and repair
functional equipment. The recovery wUl undoubtedly take decades, but retaining the
necessary resources or access to those resources wUl be of vital importance to the
nation.
2. Scenario 2: United States Wins
Discussion up to this point has focused on what must be preserved, as if
theoretically, the Soviet Union had won or been perceived as the "winner." What if
the theoretical "winner" or the perceived "winner" were the United States? What
should the United States' demands be?
The failure of the Treaty of Versailles to maintain peace in Europe, and the
success (up to the present) of the lenient terms used at the conclusion of World War
n suggest that reasonable concessions would be the most beneficial. A United States
insistence on unconditional surrender would remove anv reason the Soviets had for
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withholding their NRF and could result in unnecessary devastation of the United States.
Therefore, a United States victory will most likely be based upon a conditional
surrender and lenient peace terms, considering the devastation inflicted by both sides.
What terms should the United States insist on?
Establishing the right of the people to elect their government should be the
first priority for the United States leader, and the primary concession demanded of the
Soviet Union. The Communist Party should be disbanded and outlawed; and its
members forbidden from ever holding public office. Those members who committed
war crimes should be tried and punished. The people should then be allowed to hold
free elections to determine who would lead them and what type of government they
desire.'* They would most likely vote to maintain a Socialist government which could
provide some minimum level of health care, income, and housing. While this may not
be the type of country we want for them, it leaves them open to our influence and
provides for the possibility of change.
One of the primary functions of the Communist Party is believed to be self-
preservation; therefore, free elections will be extremely difficult to obtain. If the
Soviets have lost (or are perceived to have lost), then it will be necessary for the
United States' negotiators to convince them that they can no longer claim to be the
legitimate government; and if necessary, the U.S. and its allies should use military
force to pressure acceptance of this concession. TTie peace agreement should include
provisions to ensure compliance with this and other provisions.
'*To some extent this process is underway today under Gorbachev's policy of
democratization. Whether this will lead to westem type democracies is still unknown.
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A new Constitution should also be drafted in which the new leadership of
the Soviet Union will decide for itself which rights it will claiin for its people as
inalienable. The United States and its allies should only require that individual equality
be guaranteed, all other rights should be left to the Soviets to select.
The economic system should also be decided upon by the new Soviet
leadership. In the face of so much change (all new leaders and a new constitution) it
is unlikely that there will be any desire to change the economic system. One change
that should be strongly recommended to the new leadership is land reform. For
centuries many of the Soviet people have wanted to own the land that they farm.
Returning the land to the Soviet farmers may be one way to restore initiatives to a
society that has become dependent on the government for nearly everything. By giving
all of the fanners ten to fifteen acres instead of the one or two acres they owti today
and eliminating unproductive collectives, it may also be possible to increase the
productivity of Soviet farmlands and greatly reduce the food shortages within a few
years. Since land reform may conflict with the new form of government, the decision
should be left to the new Soviet leadership.
Removal of the Communist Party will eliminate the need to dissolve Russia
as a nation-state. Several of the regions may secede from Russian control and form
new states based on the prevailing ethnic groups within the region. Control of the East
European countries should also be an independent choice for the people in those
regions. These countries should likewise be allowed to select a new government and
leaders, excluding Communist Party members as well as a new economic system. The
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Soviet Union will still have sufficient natural resources in the form of oil, ores,
farmland, etc., to rebuild once again.
3. Scenario 3: Both Nations Lose
A third outcome besides win or lose, is the possibility that both sides will
lose. In this case, neither superpower is capable of recovering fully and those nations
which rise to prominence will establish a new order in the world. The Peoples
Republic of China (PRC) is a possible winner in this scenario. One of the primary
reasons the Soviet Union is believed to have an NRF is to prevent this Chinese
dominance.
This situation has the potential of being worse than the defeat of the United
States. This is because of the possibility of national anarchy. It is possible that the
entire fabric of society could disintegrate. In light of that possibility, the fu-st priority
would be the maintenance or restoration of a functional social order.
In any effort to restore order to society the elements of national identity
(political, military, and economic systems) must be reconstituted. It is likely that
remnants of each element will remain which can be built upon, but the remnants would
at best provide only a framework.
Politically, a functional government would have to be established which could
perform the essential tasks of administering public policy. The ability to conduct
international relations would not be immediately essential, but would become very
beneficial once physical reconstruction were to begin. TTie needs of the nation could
be phenomenal and its own capability to meet those needs very limited. In addition
to organizing international aid, the government would primarily be most needed to
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establish internal order. The demands could be so great and the resources so
disorganized that the government may initially have to act as a giant clearing house,
delegating tasks to be accomplished by organized work battalions, and rationing food
as payment.
Enforcement during this era. would most likely be heavily dependent on
martial law. The military would be most useful as a police force. The external threats
would decrease somewhat because of the reduction of the nation's wealth. There will
continue to be some necessity to protect the national boundaries, but maintaining
internal control will probably have a higher priority.
Rebuilding a functional economic system will also be essential. It will
probably be necessary to revert back to a primarily agricultural society for several years
until there is sufficient food and shelter for the population. Development beyond this
level will depend on the resources and skills available. It is possible that not much
progress will be made beyond this point for many years. It could also turnout that
after recovering from this traumatic period, the individualism that built America will
be rekindled is some key individuals and they will try building a better nation. In
either case a functioning economic system, whether agricultural or industrial, will be
necessary for subsistence and improving the quality of life.
C. CONCLUSION
The Ignited States nuclear strategy is founded on deterrence, preventing aggression
through reward, denial of objectives, or punishment through retaliation. In the event
that deterrence should fail to prevent a nuclear war, the President may have to enter
negotiations which should have as its goals, protection of the following:
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1. The Republican Form of Government-elected officials answerable to the
electorate,
2. The Value System—human rights which provides equality for all,
3. The Free Enterprise Economic System, and
4. The Resource Base—national territory and natural resources.
Since it is theoretically possible to win such a war, the United States should also
have a contingent set of goals and demands for the negotiations. TTie recommended
goals are:
1. Disband the Communist Party and hold free elections,
2. Draft a more democratic Constitution, and
3. Allow the new government to establish a new economic system.
While this penalty seems exceptionally lenient in view of the envisioned destruction,
it should be remembered that the Russians, like the Japanese and Germans, have the
potential to become fiiture allies. An alliance or a balance of power among the present
superpowers would provide the opportunity for true stability in international relations.
In the event that both nations are devastated and neither could be considered to
have won even a Pyrrhic victory, the United States goals will most likely be to:
1. Establish a functional government to maintain societal order and to obtain
international assistance,
2. Reconstitute a military force, primarily to provide law and order, and
3. Rebuild a functional economic system to initially meet the minimum
requirements of human existence and then possibly improve the standard of living.
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IV. THE JAPANESE SURRENDER
This case study will describe some of the events that led to the World War n
surrender of Japan. It will mainly cover the period from the Potsdam Proclamation to
the Emperor's public announcement of the surrender to the Japanese people.
A. INTRODUCTION
The initial call for Japan's surrender came on December 1, 1943, in the Cairo
Declaration. This document which was issued by the leaders of the United States,
China, and Great Britain, called for the unconditional surrender of Japan. It called for
the return of all the territories Japan had stolen from China and the independence of
Korea, the islands in the Pacific which Japan had seized following the start of World
War I, and all other territories which had been taken by violence. Tliis was the only
formal call for Japan to surrender until the Potsdam Proclamation.
By early April, 1945, the island of Okinawa was invaded. This caused the entire
Cabinet to resign because of their failure to prevent the enemy from landing on
Japanese territory. They were immediately replaced by the Suzuki Cabinet which was
instructed by the Emperor "to make every effort to bring the war to a conclusion as
quickly as possible."" Almost immediately, Suzuki ordered a study of Japan's fighting
capabilities. The translation is printed in the United States Strategic Bombing Survey,
"United States Strategic Bombing Survey
.
"Japan's Struggle to End the War,"
No. 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 6.
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as the "Survey of National Resources as of 1-10 June 1945," and clearly shows their
inability to win the war. The study stated that the food situation had worsened, public
morale was deteriorating, shipping space had dropped from 6 million tons at the wars
outset to 1 million tons, steel production had been so reduced, that ship construction
could not continue past mid-year, the lack of coal would soon cause suspension of
operations of various industrial areas, and the oil reserves were nearly exhausted.^
The study was so negative that Suzuki asked ex-Premier Hirota to sound out the
Russian Ambassador (Malik) for his opinion of the possibility that Russia could act
as an intermediary between Japan and her enemies. Hirota was also to attempt to
extend the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, if possible, beyond its expiration date of
April, 1946. Suzuki also had the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow (Sato) prepare the
way for improved Russo-Japanese relations so that Russia might, at the appropriate
time, intercede on Japan's behalf and end the war."
Meanwhile, as a result of Germany's collapse and the deteriorating situation on
Okinawa, the Japanese Army was preparing a document entitled, "The Fundamental
Policy to Be Followed Henceforth in the Conduct of the War," which was a call for
a decisive battle in the homeland, even if it resulted in the self-destmction of the entire
Japanese race.'*
^United States Bombing Survey , pp. 16-18.
"Robert J.C. Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender (Stanford, California; Stanford
University Press, 1954), pp. 90-91; United States Strategic Bombing Survey , p. 6.
"Butow, pp. 92-93; Lester Brooks, Behind Japan's Surrender (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968). pp. 139-141.
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On June 6*. the Japanese Army suddenly called for a meeting of the Supreme
Council for the Direction of the War (the Big Six). The Council was made up of six
members: the Premier (Suzuki), the Foreign Minister (Togo), the War Minister
(Anami), the Navy Minister (Yonai), and the Chiefs of the Army (Umezu) and Navy
(Toyoda) Staffs." The agenda had only one item, "The Fundamental Policy." The
argument presented by the military was that the entire nation would rise up and fight
to the death in an attempt to repel the enemy from the Japanese home islands. They
reasoned that the closer the enemy came to the homeland, the stronger the resolve of
the Japanese people would become. The two supporting background documents
"Estimate of the World Situation," and "The Present State of the Nation," read very
much like the study Suzuki had performed in April and May.
Foreign Minister Togo entered the Big Six meeting, uninformed about the contents
of the Fundamental Policy, and was shocked by its fu-e-and-brimstone call for a fight
to the death.*" After reading the report, he endeavored to counter the Army's
arguments, pointing out Japan's weak air defenses and dwindling supplies, but his voice
fell on deaf ears. The others were either ardent supporters of the policy or had
decided to remain silent. Togo was unable to convince them of the policy's
weaknesses and did not prevent the policy's adoption in the face of such overwhelming
support.
"Butow, p. 81.
"brooks, pp. 139-142; Butow, pp. 93-97.
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One explanation of the support for the Fundamental Policy is that the military did
not really expect to win the war, but instead intended to win an operational victory
before opening negotiations with the expectation that it would improve their bargaining
position and provide a more favorable settlement.*' In addition, the Fundamental Policy
could be used to increase the peoples productivity and improve their morale.
In the end, the Big Six unanimously adopted the Fundamental Policy. The
following day. Premier Suzuki presented the Big Six's decision to the Cabinet and
explained how the Fundamental Policy would be implemented. The invaders would be
defeated with kamikaze tactics. The people of Japan would become human explosives
"who would throw themselves beneath the enemy's tanks" as well as the now familiar
pilots in training aircraft "which would hurl themselves at the enemies war fleets and
transports."" In addition, there would also be suicide submarines, crash boats, human
torpedoes and human mines. The Cabinet approved all of these measures."
The following day, June 8*, an Imperial Conference was held to obtain the imperial
sanction, the ultimate seal on the policy. Present at the conference were the Emperor,
the Big Six (or their p)ersonal representative), the President of the Privy Council
(Hiranuma), the Munitions Minister (Teijiro Toyoda - not the same as Soemu Toyoda
who was Chief of the Navy General Staff), the Agriculture and Commerce Minister





the discussions of the previous two days were repeated, while the Emperor listened
attentively. The standard procedure was to present the Emperor with a unanimous
decision and not to trouble the god-man with the details of the arguments for or
against the proposition. In the event the Big Six could not reach a unanimous
decision, the Imperial Conference would not be held. The purpose of the Imperial
Conference was to record the fmal decisions on extremely grave matters of state in the
presence of the Emperor. The Emperor did not normally speak on such occasions, but
merely hstened and departed at the conclusion of the presentation.**
On this occasion, only Foreign Minister Togo sounded a warning. At the
conclusion, Suzuki requested everyone's opinions, but they all remained silent. So he
asked if he could assume that everyone was in agreement, and again, no one answered.
Suzuki then concluded that there were no objections to the Fundamental Policy and the
meeting was brought to a close."
B. THE POTSDAM PROCLAMATION
A month and a half later on July 26, 1945, the governments of the United States,
China, and Great Britain issued a new declaration calling for the unconditional
surrender of Japan, the Potsdam Proclamation. While this proclamation called for
unconditional surrender, there were several terms listed:
"Butow, pp. 99, 100; Brooks, p. 143.
"Butow, p. 100.
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1. The militarists had to be removed from power,
2. Parts of Japan would be temporarily occupied until the basic objectives of the
proclamation were achieved,
3. Japan would retain the four main islands and some as yet undetermined minor
islands,
4. The Japanese military must be disarmed and disbanded,
5. War criminals would be tried and punished by the Allies,
6. A democratic government would be established,
7. Japan would be allowed to rebuild its industries, but not those which would
enable Japan to militarily rearm, and
8. The occupation forces would be withdrawn once the objectives had been
accomplished and there had been established in accordance with "the freely expressed
will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.
"
The Proclamation also stated that the Allies would not tolerate a delay in Japan's
acceptance of these terms and included a warning that prompt and utter destruction
could result.**
C. JAPAN'S RESPONSE
The proclamation received considerable debate at the highest levels of Japan's
government the following day. Because the proclamation was basically an order to
surrender, instead of an invitation to negotiate, it was not well accepted by many of
the members of the Big Six or the Cabinet. Foreign Minister Togo realized that the
"Raymond Dennet and Robert K. Turner, eds., Documents on American Foreign
Relations 1945-1946 (Norwood Massachuttes: Norwood Press, 1948), pp. 105-111.
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terms offered were the best Japan could get at that time and that it was worded
broadly enough that a favorable interpretation of the terms could be of some benefit
to Japan." He therefore argued in the meetings of the Big Six and the Cabinet that
efforts to obtain Russian mediation must be more heavily pursued in order to have the
terms clarified, preferably in Japan's favor. In light of the divided opinion, Togo also
argued that the government should not make any formal statement regarding the
Potsdam Proclamation.
Premier Suzuki had a view similar to Togo, but slightly different. Instead of
Togo's "wait and see" response, Suzuki used the word "mokusatsu," which literally
translates as "kill with silence," but is more frequently translated as "treat with silent
contempt," or simply "ignore it."**
At the conclusion of the meeting, it was agreed that a sanitized version of the
proclamation would be released to the press without comment. While the proper
version was released to the press, the newspapers also stated that the government's
attitude toward the proclamation was "mokusatsu." All of this appeared in the morning
papers on July 28*.*' How this statement reached the press remains unknown.
The possible repercussions of this statement were serious. In light of their attempts
at opening negotiations through Russia's good offices, this statement appeared to be a
*'Butow, p. 143.
"Butow, p. 145; Brooks, p. 160.
*'Butow, p. 145.
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complete contradiction of their actions. The government was achieving the exact
opposite of its desired goal.
The morning of Saturday, July 28*^ was also the regular weekly meeting of the
Supreme Command and the press statement was the major topic. The Army and Navy
Chiefs of Staff and the War Minister felt that the phrase "mokusatsu" was inadequate
and called for a government statement which denounced the Potsdam Proclamation.
The Navy Minister, Yonai, attempted to calm his colleagues, but to no avail. Foreign
Minister Togo had been called away on urgent business leaving Premier Suzuki to
pacify the militarists.^
Even after considerable discussion, Suzuki refused to disclaim the proclamation
completely. At this point the Chief Cabinet Secretary, Sakomizu, suggested a
compromise. Since a press conference was scheduled for 4 p.m. that afternoon, it
would provide an opportunity for Suzuki to respond to a question regarding the
proclamation without the government providing an official statement. The Premier
would be provided a statement to give in response to the "planted" question.
The statement was to be drafted by Sakomizu and the Political Affairs Chiefs of
the Army and Navy. Sakomizu prepared one statement after another, but every
correction came back more forcefully worded. As time became short, a satisfactory
statement was agreed to and provided to the Premier. In response to the planted
question, Suzuki said,
I think the joint declaration by the three powers is nothing but a repetition of the
Cairo Declaration. The government does not see much value in it. All we have
""Butow, pp. 147, 148; Brooks, pp. 160, 161.
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to do is mokusatsu it. What we should do is devote ourselves to the prosecution
of the war."
While the cabinet secretary may have intended for "mokusatsu" to be interpreted
as "no comment," it was read by the foreign press and governments as a contemptuous
rejection of the Allies ultimatum. As a result, the government which found the
Potsdam Proclamation to be vague enough to open negotiations and was only waiting
on a response from Russia, ended up eliminating any chance of a negotiated success.
This linguistic fumble provided the United States with the justification it needed for
using the atomic bomb and likewise provided Russia an excuse for invading Manchuria.
During the next week or so, Togo pressed Sato (Japan's Ambassador in Moscow)
for a Soviet reply. In turn Sato met with Vice Foreign Commissar Lazovsky on the
30"' of July. Lazovsky was noncommittal, but promised to inform Molotov upon his
return from Potsdam that Sato had come seeking an answer to his government's
request. Molotov did not reach Moscow until August 5* and Sato was not given an
appointment untO 5 p.m. on August 8* (11 p.m. Tokyo time).
D. HIROSHIMA
On August 6*, at 8:15 a.m. a single B-29 dropped a 20 kiloton (TNT equivalent)
atomic weapon on Hiroshima. The immediate result was a brilliant flash, incinerating
heat and extremely high winds which destroyed 90% of the city's buUdings and
indiscriminately killed 80.000 Japanese." The Emperor was informed approximately




one hour later, by the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Kido. He was told that a new
type of weapon had been used on the city of Hiroshima and that it had wiped out
"scores of thousands of men, women, and children and laid waste to the city; the god
reacted as a man.""
The Emperor had spent much of the previous night in the Imperial air raid shelter
discussing affairs of state with his brother and had not slept much. This, combined
with the rumor of the obliteration of the innocent people of Hiroshima, brought tears
to the Emperor's eyes. Kido later said, "He was overwhelmed with grief for the
innocent civilians who were its victims."^*
The Emperor, heavily disturbed, said. Under these circumstances, we must bow
to the inevitable. No matter what happens to my j)ersonal safety, we must put
an end to this war as speedily as possible, so that this tragedy will not be
repeated."
The Emperor's resolve had been solidified, his personal desires would soon become
action.
E. AUGUST T'^
The following day, the enemy was heavily broadcasting the news of its use of the
atom bomb. News trickled into Tokyo on the conditions in Hiroshima, but there was
"Brooks, pp. 169, 170.
^*Leonard Mosley, Hirohito, Emperor of Japan (London, England: Prentice-Hall
International, Inc., 1966), p. 312; Brooks, p. 170.
"Mosley, p. 312; Brooks, p. 170. None of the quotes attributed to the Emperor
are based on a transcript of the Emperor's actual words, but instead on the recollection
of the participants in an effort to record the meaning of his speech.
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very little solid evidence. Both the Japanese Anny and Navy considered the matter
still under investigation and the evidence unsubstantiated.
That afternoon the Cabinet met and Foreign Minister Togo took the initiative to
review the conditions as he understood them. He then pointed out the implications for
continuing the war when the enemy had demonstrated that it had the "ultimate
weapon." He urged serious consideration of the Potsdam Proclamation. The other
ministers wouldn't hear of it. War Minister Anami said that until the facts could be
verified, Japan should proceed with caution.^* In the face of the gravest circumstances,
the Cabinet remained deadlocked and failed to act.
F. AUGUST S"
The following day no official meetings occurred. Togo did have an audience with
the Emperor in the afternoon at which time he relayed a detailed report of the
information contained in the enemy's news broadcasts to Hirohito. He also emphasized
the gravity of the situation and recommended an acceptance of the Potsdam
Proclamation to end the war.^ The Emperor was unhappy with the failed efforts
towards peace, the increasing misery of his people and the perverted logic of the
military extremists that caused the conflict to continue. He wanted only to stop the
bombings and end the killing. Hirohito told Togo that:
since the nation can no longer continue the struggle with this weapon opposing
it, Japan should not miss the chance for peace by vain efforts to secure better




therefore, all efforts should be concentrated on ending the fighting quickly. Tell
the prime minister of my thinking/'
After withdrawing from the Imperial presence, the Foreign Minister knew he had the
Emperor's full support for a peace initiative and that he must now fmd a way to bring
that omnipotent influence to bear on those who opposed terminating the war.^
Foreign Minister Togo visited Privy Seal Kido and informed him of the Emperor's
statement prior to stopping to discuss the matter with Premier Suzuki. Having heard
Togo's version of the Emperor's statement and thoughts, Suzuki agreed that a meeting
of the Big Six was in order. The earliest the Big Six could coordinate a conference
would be 10:30 a.m. the following morning.*^
At 11 p.m. that evening (5 p.m. Moscow time) Ambassador Sato met with Molotov
hoping for a favorable response to Japan's request for Soviet mediation. The Emperor
had also requested that Prince Konoye be admitted to Russia as a special envoy to
deliver a personal message from the Throne. Sato had high hopes for these requests.
As Sato and his secretary entered Molotov 's office, he began to greet Molotov, but was
tersely interrupted by him. Molotov informed him that he had a communique from the
government of the Soviet Union to the government of Japan. Molotov then proceeded





While Molotov said that Sato would be able to cable Japan, Sato's message never
arrived. At 1 a.m. (Japan time) the forces of the Soviet Union invaded Manchuria."
The Neutrality Pact had failed to hold off an attack from the Soviet Union. The
formal declaration of war was not presented to the Japanese government until August
10*.
G. AUGUST 9**
At approximately 10 a.m. the following moming, the Privy Seal, Kido, arrived at
the palace for an audience with the Emperor. The Emperor immediately informed
Kido that hostilities had been commenced by the Soviet Union and ordered him to
coordinate with Premier Suzuki to reach a rapid end to the war. Coincidentally,
Suzuki was arriving at the Palace as Kido was departing from his audience. Kido
immediately informed him of the Emperor's expressed desire to end the war and again
impressed upon him the urgency of the situation. Suzuki concurred with the Emperor's
opinion and stated that he felt that the time for negotiating had passed, and that Japan
must now accept the terms of the Potsdam Proclamation with the reservation that the
Imperial structure would be retained. Suzuki hastily departed to expedite the upcoming
session of the Big Six and a follow-up meeting of the Cabinet." At about this same
time the city of Nagasaki was obliterated.
*'Butow, pp. 153, 154; Brooks, p. 172: Louis Morton. "The Decision to Use the
Atomic Bomb," Foreign Affairs
.
35 (Jan. 1957), p. 351.
"Butow, p. 160; Brooks, p. 58.
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1. Supreme Council Meeting
The meeting began at about 1 1 a.m. and with an atmosphere of the utmost
urgency, Premier Suzuki recapitulated the events of the past three days and stated that
in view of the latest developments, it was no longer possible to continue the war. He
also urged acceptance of the terms the enemy had offered at Potsdam. This was
followed by a period of silence which was finally interrupted by Navy Minister Yonai.
As the Navy Minister saw it the terms could be accepted in one of two ways. First,
accept the proclamation with a single reservation, the continuation of the Imperial
house; or second, negotiate for more favorable terms, in three additional areas: the
disarmament process, the punishment of war criminals, and the occupation of Japan."
Accepting the proclamation with only the one reservation was preferred by
Premier Suzuki, Foreign Minister Togo, and Navy Minister Yonai (the commitment of
each of them varied). They argued that based on the enemy's attitude, any additional
reservations or stipulations would cause the enemy to ignore Japan's proposals and lead
to an immediate breakdown in discussions."
War Minister, Anami, Army Chief of Staff, Umezu, and Navy Chief of Staff,
Toyoda, all preferred to negotiate additional terms. On the three areas, the militarists
each agreed with the desired terms. First, they wanted to completely prevent any
occupation of Japan or at least the city of Tokyo. In addition, they wanted to limit
the number of occupied locations and occupying forces to the bare minimum. Second,
"Butow, p. 160; Brooks, p. 58.
"Butow, pp. 160-163.
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it would be unfair for war criminals to be tried, judged, and sentenced by a victorious
enemy. That responsibility should be carried out by senior Japanese officers. Finally,
these men wanted to disarm and demobilize their own forces, in effect, accepting the
surrender of their own men. They wanted it to appear that the military had voluntarily
disbanded in order to prevent the world from collapsing into chaos. A successful
accomplishment of these three goals would provide an appearance to future generations
that the Japanese military had not been defeated."
Each side argued their points vigorously and endlessly. During this meeting,
news of the destruction of Nagasaki reached the meeting but had no affect.** "It was
like a conference of the walking dead.'"^ At 1 p.m., with the three to three stalemate
unresolved. Premier Suzuki adjourned the meeting and postponed the Cabinet meeting
until 2 p.m."
2. Cabinet Meeting
Shortly after 2 p.m.. Premier Suzuki called the meeting to order and asked
Togo to review the situation. He outlined the arguments presented at the Big Six
meeting after which the meeting rapidly deteriorated into an intense debate over the
same two choices. The discussion which should have been academic at this point and
rapidly resolved, instead continued unabated. At 5:30 p.m., a one hour recess was
called after which the arguments were again repeated. Shortly before 10 p.m.. Premier
"Butow, p. 161; Brooks, pp. 58-61.




Suzuki called for a consensus but it was to no avail, the members remained hopelessly
deadlocked. Since a unanimous opinion had again evaded the national leaders, the
meeting recessed for the evening.*' During this meeting, a petition for an Imperial
Conference was drafted and signed by the Premier and the two Chiefs of Staff. The
latter two signed under the pretense that once a consensus was reached, this would
speed along the process of organizing an Imperial Conference. After all, the Emperor
had never before been presented with anything other than a unanimous decision and
he had rarely spoke at such events even though he might have personally opposed the
decisions presented to him. This action by the Chiefs of Staff, taken for their own
convenience, would prove to be a mistake.
3. The Imperial Conference
Following the Cabinet meeting. Premier Suzuki and Foreign Minister Togo
briefed the Emperor on the fruitless wrangling and the resulting deadlock. Then Suzuki
presented the j)etition and proposed convening an Imperial Conference that night. His
Majesty agreed. All three of them realized the potential significance of this
unprecedented event. For the first time in the history of the Imperial system, the
Emperor himself could be in a position of deciding national policy. For hundreds of
years this situation had resulted in the dissolution of the existing Cabinet and formation
of a new Cabinet. Only because of the exceptional circumstances was Suzuki able to
"Butow. pp. 164, 165; Brooks, pp. 66-72; Mosley, pp. 313. 314.
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recommend, and the Emperor willing to accept, convening an Imperial Conference with
the intention of having the Emperor resolve such a dispute.*"
Anami. Umezu, and Toyoda were livid when they received their respective
conference calls and realized that the signed p)etition had been used. Regardless of
these feelings, they now had to respond to the Imperial summons.
H. AUGUST 10*
Shortly before midnight, the Emperor entered the underground air raid shelter
adjoining the Imperial library as the members of the Imperial Conference stood up and
bowed. Premier Suzuki had the Chief Cabinet Secretary read the Potsdam Proclamation
and brief the two alternatives. It was also noted that in the earlier cabinet meeting six
members had favored accepting the ultimatum with only one reservation, (guaranteed
maintenance and security of the Imperial family); three desired additional conditions
in the areas of disarmament, punishment of war criminals and the occupation of Japan;
and five were neutral, but desired reducing the number of conditions.
At this point, Togo was asked to speak for his point of view. He repeated the
necessity of not responding with so many conditions that the enemy would consider
the response a rejection and refuse to negotiate further. His position was supported by
Yonai.
The War Minister was then provided an opportunity to present his arguments. He
pointed out that without the additional conditions, the war should be continued in order
to inflict a decisive blow at the enemy on the homeland. This would gravely wound
'^utow, p. 165; Brooks, p. 72: Mo«;ley. p. 314.
58
the invaders and allow the Japanese to negotiate and obtain all four conditions before
the enemy regrouped. If the military proved unable to repel the first assault, Anami
argued, then the entire Japanese race would prefer death to the dishonor of surrender.
The extinction of 100 million people would be Jean's marie on history. This entire
statement was supported by both Umezu and Toyoda.
The majority of the rest of the meeting was spent bringing the President of the
Privy Counsel, Hiranuma, up to speed on the current events and answering his
questions. He was not a member of either the Cabinet or the Big Six and as a result
he repeated and belabored every point all over again. In the end, he agreed with
Togo's point of view."
Of those who had spoken, they were evenly split, three to three. Suzuki once
again took charge of the meeting, it was nearly 2 a.m. He stated the obvious, that the
group was hopelessly deadlocked, but then he did the unexpected. Emphasizing the
gravity of the situation and the importance of overcoming this impasse, Suzuki deviated
from centuries of tradition and asked the Emperor for his opinion. (He also stated
that this opinion should be substituted for the decision that the Cabinet had been
unable to reach.) Never before in the previous 2,600 years of the Imperial system had
an Emf)eror been requested to convey his opinion on any issue brought before him.
Normally a stalemate of this sort would have been resolved by dissolving the Cabinet
and forming a new one. On this occasion, the Emperor must have felt that the crisis
"Butow, pp. 168-174; Brooks, pp. 76-85; Mosley. pp. 314, 315.
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was so severe and the penalty for inaction so great, that he must act immediately to
end the turmoil, regardless of the cost.
The Emperor rose to his feet, visibly emotional. "For a few moments his Adam's
apple gulped so much that it got in the way of his words and what came out at first
was high and strained and abrasive. And then, slowly he took courage and calmed
down.""
I have given serious thought to the situation prevailing at home and abroad and
have concluded that continuing the war can only mean destruction for the nation
and prolongation of bloodshed and cruelty in the world. I cannot bear to see my
people suffer any longer. Ending the war is the only way to restore world peace
and to relieve the nation from the dreadful distress with which it is burdened."
Hirohito then pointed to several failings of the military and implied that as a result,
Japan was not defensible. Towards the end of his speech, he returned once again to
the sorrow he felt as the father of his race.
I cannot help feeling sad when I consider the people who have served me so
loyally, the soldiers and sailors who have been killed or wounded in the
battlefields overseas, the families who have lost their homes and so often their
lives as well in the air raids here. I need not tell you how unbearable I find it
to see the brave and loyal fighting men of Japan disarmed. It is equally
unbearable that others who have given me devoted service should now be
threatened with punishment as the instigators of the war. Nevertheless, the time
has come when we must bear the unbearable.'*
His voice faltered momentarily and then he concluded.
All of you, I think, will worry about me in this situation. But, it does not matter
what will become of me. Determined as I have stated, I have decided to bring
"Mosley, p. 316.
"Butow. p. 175; Brooks, p. 105; Mosley. p. 316.
'^Butow, pp. 175, 176; Brooks, p. 107; Mosley. p. 317.
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the war to an end immediately. For this reason I agree with the Foreign
Mini<;ter's proposal."
The descendant of the Sun Goddess had expressed his desire. Between 3 a.m.
and 4 a.m., the Cabinet met and unanimously approved the Emperor's wishes, thereby
making the Imperial desires into a binding legal action. By the early moming hours
of August 10"', Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam Proclamation with one clarification
were en route to the Allied powers. Later that same moming Soviet Ambassador
Malik would deliver Russia's declaration of war to Foreign Minister Togo. This was
a mere formality since Japan knew of the war shortly after the invasion of Manchuria
began at 1 a.m. on the moming of August 9**. At the same meeting he was informed
of Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam Proclamation.** On the evening of August 10*,
the first scientific confirmation of an atomic bomb at Hiroshima was received by the
Japanese government. The Army had received confirmation earlier, but withheld the
information.'^
Because of the location of Japan and the United States, with respect to the
intemational date line, Japan's telegram of acceptance with the single proviso, arrived
in Washington, D.C., at about the same time it had left Tokyo. This was unusual
since it was not sent to Washington, D.C. directly, but to the Swiss and then passed
on to the Americans.
"Brooks, p. 108; Butow, p. 176; Mosley, p. 317.
'*Butow, p. 181; Brooks, pp. 175-177.
''Brooks, pp. 193, 194.
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In the early morning of August 10*. Secretary of State Byrnes, presented Japan's
telegram at a White House conference to the President, the Secretaries of War and
Navy, the President's Chief of Staff, military and naval aides, and the Director of the
Office of War Mobilization. Byrnes view, which was later adopted by the President,
was that the United States should not abandon its insistence for an unconditional
surrender, but that if terms were going to be offered, the United States should be
making the offer.
The result was that Byrnes drafted a response which implied that the Emperor
would be supervised and possibly restricted by the Supreme Commander. It had to be
carefully worded because the United States would be speaking for Russia, Great
Britain, and China as well. For this reason the response could not be written in such
a way that it could be interpreted to alter the terms listed at Potsdam. The response
was intended as a clarification, not a commitment. Quoted below is the key portion
of the response which was approved by the three Allies as well."
From the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese
Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the
Allied powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the
surrender terms. The ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in accordance
with the Potsdam Declaration, be established by the freely expressed wUl of the
Japanese people."
"Butow, pp. 190, 191.
"Dennet and Turner, pp. 105-111
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I. Arci'ST n"-
The Allies had all responded before midnight on August 10* and the United States
response was dispatched to the Swiss shortly thereafter. In addition, the text was
released to the press and radio. Shortly after midnight on August 12*, the Japanese
received a San Francisco broadcast containing the complete text of the response of the
United States government. After forty-eight hours of rising tension and self-doubt, the
Japanese now had the basis for conducting a preliminary discussion and formulating
a response.
The reactions to the American response was predictably divided. The Japanese
Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff had an audience with the Emperor that morning in
which they recommended rejecting the United States' offer for two reasons. First, their
interpretation of the Emperor being "subject to" the Supreme Commander meant
"subordinate to", not "limited by." Such a condition was unthinkable. Second, the
"free will" clause could be used by the Allies to impose what ever controls they
desired and then claim it was the people's will. Also if a republic were established
by the will of the people, then the Imperial household must fall. The Emperor
recommended continued study until the formal reply had arrived. After their departure,
Hirohito, felt as if they had not listened to him at all in the Imperial Conference.'^
At about 1 1 a.m., Foreign Minister Togo also had an audience with Hirohito in which
he expressed concern over "the free will of the people" clause since it could be
"^Brooks, pp. 217-220.
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contradictory to the Imperial system. In spite of this concern. Togo found the response
acceptable.""
At 3 p.m., the Cabinet met in special session to discuss the Allied response. The
members again were divided on accepting the proposal (although it had not yet
formally arrived). The cabinet members began to be swayed by the "Death before
Dishonor" faction and when Premier Suzuki began to speak in similar terms, Togo
realized he could not win an immediate vote. To gain time to talk with Suzuki
privately, Togo proposed adjouming the meeting until the formal reply was received.
The meeting was adjourned shortly after 5 p.m. To gain some additional time, Togo
concurred with a subordinate's recommendation to have the Allies formal reply
(expected that evening) held and recorded as being received the following morning.'"^
J. AUGUST 13'"
At 8:45 a.m., a meeting of the Big Six convened, but was shortly thereafter
interrupted. An Imperial summons arrived for the two Chiefs of Staff. They arrived
at the palace by 9 a.m. and were questioned by the Emperor. He wanted to know
what military operations would be conducted whUe the negotiations were under way.
Umezu replied for both of them that, the military would only undertake defensive
operations. The Emperor was satisfied with this response and the Chiefs of Staff
returned to their original meeting.'"'
'°'Mosley, p. 321.
'"brooks, pp. 225-227.
'"'Brooks, pp. 239. 240.
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The Big Six debated the question for hours, and finally at 2 p.m., hopelessly
deadlocked, the Premier adjourned the meeting and scheduled a Cabinet meeting for
an hour later. When the Cabinet convened at 3 p.m., the Premier had the United
States' reply read by the Secretary and followed by an immediate vote. Ten favored
acceptance, three were opposed. TTie cycle began once again, as the three proved to
be immovable. All afternoon the discussion continued, each side trying creative new
approaches to the same old arguments. Finally, at 7 p.m., having again spent an entire
day in a futile stalemate, Suzuki polled the Cabinet. Ten favored accepting the offer,
three wanted further negotiations, one couldn't make up his mind, and one gave his
proxy to Suzuki. With this Suzuki stated that he would make a report on the meeting
to the Emperor and once again ask for his decision. He then adjourned the meeting."**
Between 9 p.m. and 11 p.m., the two Chiefs of Staff again rehashed all the questions
of the day with Togo in a vain attempt to change his views. The Cabinet was
scheduled to reconvene at 10 a.m. the following moming to resolve the question.
K. AUGUST 14*^
All the negotiations had been conducted secretly and without the knowledge of
the Japanese people. Therefore, when five B-29s dropped leaflets on five major
Japanese cities including Tokyo and informed the people of Japan's offer to surrender,
the Japanese leadership was gravely disturbed. It was feared that when the leaflets
reached the hands of those who had been fighting so intensely, there was the real
'Brooks, pp. 245-251.
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potential that the military would completely overthrow the govemment. In order to
prevent this, peace had to be concluded without delay.
Kido hastily arranged to meet with the Emperor at 8:30 a.m. after reading the
leaflet. At the royal audience, Kido informed the Emperor of the potential for a
military coup and recommended that the Emperor exercise his privilege to call an
Imperial Conference. Kido also recommended that the EmpcroT again tell them of his
unshakable desire to end the war immediately. The Emperor understood the situation
completely and agreed with Kido's recommendations.
As Kido was departing to arrange the Imperial Conference, Suzuki arrived. Kido
showed him a leaflet and informed him of his opinion and the Emperor's response.
After a brief discussion the pair arranged to see Hirohito jointly, and were admitted at
approximately 8:40 a.m. In view of the urgency, the Emperor ordered that the
conference start at 10 a.m.
The Conference started at 10:50 a.m. when the Emperor arrived. Premier Suzuki
stated that the conference had been called by the Emperor to consider the Allied reply
in his presence. He also outlined the events of the previous meetings and the
arguments for each side. After which the Premier called upon the Army Chief of
Staff, Umezu, the Navy Chief of Staff. Toyoda, and the War Minister, Anami, to
support their case. Again they repeated their well worn arguments about protecting the
Imperial structure and a final battle which would, at a minimum, provide the war
termination on the conditions they found acceptable. After the three had spoken,
Hirohito stood up. He stated that he had listened carefully to each of them, but that
they had failed to persuade him to change his opinion. He saw no benefit to
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continuing the war. His review of the United States' response found it acceptable and
in it evidence of the peaceful and friendly intentions of the enemy. At this point his
emotions began to empt. He choked on the words and had to use the tips of his white
gloves to wipe away the tears. He understood the difficulty of the military men who
would have to surrender and those who would be tried as war criminals. His voice
was strained and he spoke only in phrases, but he continued:
In spite of these feelings, so difficult to bear, I cannot endure the thought of
letting my people suffer any longer. A continuation of the war would bring
death to tens, perhaps even hundreds, of thousands of persons. The whole nation
would be reduced to ashes. '°'
TTie Emperor paused, collected his thoughts and calmed his emotions. He reminded
them that they had borne defeat before (the Triple Intervention when France, Germany
and Russia forced Japan to retum the Liaotung Peninsula to China after her victory in
the Sino-Japanese war in 1894-1895.) He exhorted them to endure the unendurable and
suffer the insufferable with him as their ancestors before had done.'** In conclusion,
he ordered an Imperial rescript prepared so that he could speak to his children. This
would prevent extremists from claiming that the Emperor had been swayed by
"insincere advisors." It would remove the possibility that the military could take over
the government in an effort to protect the Emperor. Hirohito's will to end the war
would be made known by direct presentation and not by his advisor's interpretations.
Hirohito closed by asking for their continued support.
'"'Butow, pp. 207, 208; Mosley, p. 325.
'"^Brooks, pp. 265-267.
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There was no further debate. The war was over. Later that day Japan's acceptance
of the Potsdam Proclamation was forwarded to neutral countries for delivery to the
United States. Just before midnight Hirohito recorded the rescript that would be played
the following day to his subjects. At the Emperor's insistence, a second copy was
made for insurance. While there was a small revolt lead by a couple of military
extremists, it was not successful and the discs were not harmed. At noon on August
15th, the Emperor's words were broadcast throughout the nation. A segment of that
statement, quoted below, clearly reflected the Emperor's personal concerns.
...the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of
which to do damage is indeed incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives.
Should We continue to fight, it would not only result in an ultimate collapse
and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total
extinction of human civilization. Such being the case, how are We to save the
millions of Our subjects; or to atone Ourselves before the hollowed Spirits of Our
Imperial Ancestors? This is the reason why We have ordered the acceptance of
the provisions of the Joint Declaration of the Powers.'"'
L. CONCLUSION
Premier Suzuki, who was given a mandate by the Emperor to end the war as
rapidly as possible, proved to be a most counter-productive statesman. He shifted from
one point of view to another and then back again. After first completing a survey of
the nation's resources, and coming to grips with the realization that Japan could not
win, and needed to end the war, Suzuki unexpectedly allowed the military to use the
Fundamental Policy to direct the nation to fight to the death. A more consistent
""Dennet and Turner, pp. 105-111.
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alternative would have been to ally himself with Foreign Minister Togo to oppose such
a policy.
Then, following the Potsdam Proclamation, Suzuki, used the ill chosen word,
"mokusatsu," at a press conference to describe the government's feeling toward the
Proclamation. This provided the United States with the justification it needed to use
the atomic bomb.
After the bombing of Hiroshima and hearing about the Emp>eror's comments, Suzuki
shifted back to working to ending the war. At the meetings of the Big Six, the
Cabinet, and at the Imperial Conference, Suzuki opposed the military hard-liners and
their arguments for a final decisive battle.
Following the United States' response, Suzuki was again swayed by the arguments
of the military leaders and lost sight of his mandate as Premier. Only after a
discussion with Foreign Minister Togo did Suzuki regain his focus on ending the war.
In contrast to Premier Suzuki's shifting opinions, the military leaders, with the
exception of Navy Minister Yonai, endlessly pursued the decisive battle and possibly
negotiations afterwards on terms that would be more favorable to Japan than the
Potsdam Proclamation.
Foreign Minister Togo consistently opposed any continuation of the war at every
opportunity. But, in the final analysis, because of the inability of Togo and the
military leaders to reach a consensus, it was the opinion of the Emperor alone that
made the final decision to terminate the war.
Hirohito had always opposed the war, but it was not the Emperor's place to contest
the policies unanimously presented to him. His efforts to influence Premier Suzuki at
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his appointment seem to have missed the target. The Emperor's efforts to send Prince
Konoye to Moscow also were checked by Soviet indifference.
It was not until the bombing of Hiroshima that the opportunity was made available
to the Emperor to play a more decisive role. On two occasions the Big Six and the
Cabinet were unable to resolve the divisions among themselves to either continue or
end the war. On both of those occasions, it was the Emperor who brolce with
centuries of tradition to end the hopeless stalemate. But since he had opposed the war
from the outset, what had made it so severe that Hirohito felt compelled to violate the
traditions of his ancestral heritage?
The Emperor's own words provide the answer. Following Hiroshima,
...we must put an end to this war as speedily as possible, so that this tragedy will
not happen again.
During the Imperial Conference in the early morning hours of August 10"",
I cannot bear to see my f)eople suffer any longer. Ending the war is the only
way to restore world peace and to relieve the nation from the dreadful distress
with which it is burdened.
At the Imperial Conference on August 14*,
...I caiinot endure the thought of letting my people suffer any longer. A
continuation of the war would bring death to tens, perhaps even hundreds, of
thousands of persons. The whole nation would be reduced to ashes.
In the Imperial Rescript,
...the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of
which to do damage is indeed incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives.
Should We continue to fight, it would not only result in an ultimate collapse
and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total
extinction of human civilization.
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From the above quotations and the emotional outbreaks cited with them, one can
see a train of thought emerging. TTie use of the first atomic bomb was so devastating
that the Emperor felt compelled to end the war. At the war's outset, he could accept
the unanimous decision of his advisors. At its conclusion, he felt obligated to use his
considerable influence to override those who held an opposing view.
The atomic bomb was in essence, the tool which not only strengthened the
Emperor's personal convictions, but also motivated him to take action. The Emperor
was the only individual capable of transforming his personal desires into political
actions. Since he was compelled to take this action only after the atomic bomb had
been used, it is reasonable to conclude that this weapon was and can be used in the
future to achieve political goals. This is not to advocate the use of nuclear weapons
for trivial or even major disputes, but when global peace hangs in the balance, the use
of nuclear weapons is a possible option which could be considered to resolve military
and political conflict of this scale.
Beyond the personalities involved there are several other points worth noting.
First, the Soviet Union adhered to the commonly accepted diplomatic formality of
providing a formal declaration of war prior to attacking the Japanese Army in
Manchuria. Today it is commonly assumed that no such warning would be given prior
to an attack, but this case study does not support such a view point.
Second, the news of the second atomic bomb destroying the city of Nagasaki had
no noticeable affect on any member of the Big Six when they were informed during
their meeting of August 9*. The Emperor's response is not available, but the
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indifference of the Big Six demonstrates an important point. The fust use of the
weapon was the most shocking and the most effective. This point is also supported
by the three to three vote at the conclusion of the Big Six meeting on August 9^^. The
second atomic bomb did not convince even one member to change his vote.
Finally, the leaflets which were dropped on Tokyo and four other cities highlighted
the urgency with which the peace had to be concluded. Because of the potential for
a coup which would place the military in complete control of Japan, it was necessary
for the Emperor to convene an Imperial Conference and reach the fmal decision to
accept the United States' reply. It is also clear from the speeches made by the three
military officers at the Imperial Conference that they were not swayed by the leaflets
to change their votes from continuing the war to ending it.
72
V. CONCLUSIONS
Given the complexity of war termination, this chapter will synthesize the major
components of the previous chapters and will also draw on the case study for analogies
that may apply to today's nuclear reserve force (NRF).
A. WESTERN THEORY OF WAR TERMINATION
Nuclear war termination is the cessation (for any reason) of the use of all nuclear
weapons. It can be achieved in several ways: both nuclear arsenals are exhausted, the
combatants reach a mutual cease-fu-e agreement, one opponent accepts defeat, or both
sides agree to deescalate from a nuclear war to a conventional war.
The objective of nuclear war termination for the United States is to persuade the
enemy to end the conflict without achieving his original objectives and on terms which
are more favorable to the United States than the Soviet Union.
The only unclassified guidance available on war termination is in the Annual Report
of the Secretary of Defense to Congress. While this document is a programming
document and does not provide official war-fighting doctrine, for the purposes of this
thesis it is considered to be consistent with the actual intention of the guidance on war
termination. An analysis of the ten most recent reports yielded two major themes.
First, the nuclear reserve force is to provide for a peace settlement which is more
favorable to the United States than the Soviet Union. And second, escalation should
be limited to the lowest possible level.
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In order to obtain this objective western scholarship on this subject has developed
eight theoretical requirements. They are:
1. Both nations will require legitimate (recognized) leadership.
2. Pragmatic political leaders mu.st prevail over zealous military leaders.
3. Each side must have a nuclear reserve force.
4. Command centers wUl be needed by both sides to evaluate data and plan attacks.
5. Communications capabilities will be vital in efforts: to monitor enemy broadcasts,
to maintain control of the NRF. to negotiate through intermediaries, and to keep each
nations' population advised (to the extent desired) of the progress and conclusion of
the war.
6. Each side should retain an adequate warning and assessment capability.
7. Diplomats will be required to authenticate the enemy's leaders and negotiators
to prevent negotiations with illegitimate representatives.
8. It will be necessary for diplomats to verify cease-fire measures and surrender
terms.'"'
Only two of the theoretical requirements were not supported by the case study.
The war was concluded without a NRF on both sides, and the need for a warning and
assessment capability was questionable. Otherwise, the significance of the war
termination requirements in ending the war with Japan varied. Emperor Hirohito's
legitimacy as a national leader and his personal pragmatism played significant roles as
did the communications capability of both nations. The command centers, and the
'See foomote number 9.
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diplomatic requirements for authentication and verification appear to be of less
significance based on the case study.
B. SOVIET VIEW OF WAR TERMINATION
The Soviet Union of today, like the United States, has no desire to initiate a war.
The Soviet Union does continue to pursue the fruits of war (increased access to
resources and technology, respect as a world leader, and greater influence in
international affairs) by other means. The Soviet Union is not expected to initiate a
nuclear war except as a last result when all other methods of conflict resolution have
failed. Even at that point the Soviets are not expected to start a nuclear offensive
unless they are convinced the United States is preparing for a first strike. Once the
Soviet leaders believe a nuclear war is inevitable they are expected to launch a massive
preemptive attack in their own defense.
Such a war could only be initiated if it were sanctioned under the Soviet's just war
doctrine and if it could assure victory. Since the Soviet Union only engages in wars
that are fought by the proletariat class in the interest of consolidating and developing
socialism, all of their wars are just wars.
Victory is not thought of by the Soviets as we think of it in the United States.
Americans tend to equate victory with the unconditional surrender policy of World War
n. The Soviets on the other hand define victory as meeting the political objectives
of the war as established by the Communist Party. Since a global nuclear war would
be the most devastating, the most costly, and the most political war ever fought, the
postulated set of objectives, which would justify such a war, is expected to be:
1. Defeat of the enemy forces and potential.
2. Seizure of Strategic Areas.
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3. Occupation and Control.
4. Ideological Conversion.
As a result, victory is expected to be judged based on the degree to which the goals
are accomplished.
C. UNITED STATES NATIONAL COALS
The current national security objectives (in peacetime) stress deterring war and
should that fail, concluding the war on terms which are favorable to the United States
while limiting escalation to the minimum required. Once the war has begun the
national objectives are expected to change. Three scenarios have been postulated and
the objectives derived for each are listed below.
L Scenario 1: United States Loses
If the United States loses or is perceived to have lost there are several cultural
aspects which must be protected during the negotiations and they are:
1. The Republican Form of Govemment--elected officials answerable to the
electorate,
2. The Value System—human rights which provides equality for all,
3. The Free Enterprise Economic System, and
4. The Resource Base—national territory and natural resources.
2. Scenario 2: United States Wins
In the event that the L^nited States is in a position to make demands on the
Soviet Union, the following objectives are recommended:
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1. Disband the Communist Party and hold free elections,
2. Draft a more democratic Constitution, and
3. Allow the new government to establish a new economic system.
3. Scenario 3: Both Nations Lose
In the event that both nations are devastated and neither could be considered
to have won even a Pyrrhic victory, the United States goals will most likely be to:
1. Establish a functional government to maintain societal order and to obtain
international assistance,
2. Reconstitute a military force, primarily to provide law and order, and
3. Rebuild a functional economic system to initially meet the minimum
requirements of human existence and then possibly improve the standard of living.
D. CASE STUDY: THE JAPANESE SURRENDER
The Potsdam Proclamation was issued in late July, 1945 to provide the Japanese
the opportunity to surrender and save both countries from senselessly continuing the
war. Premier Suzuki unwisely made a statement at a press conference to a "planted"
question that was interpreted as a contemptuous rejection of the terms offered. This
statement provided the United States with the justification it was seeking to use the
atomic bomb. The Soviet Union used it to justify declaring war on the Japanese and
invade Manchuria to attack the Japanese Army.
On August 6, 1945, Hiroshima was decimated with one twenty kiloton atomic
bomb. The effects on Emperor Hirohito were overwhelming. The grief he felt for the
innocent civilians who were killed or injured was so great that he began to cry. He
stated that the war must be ended at all costs, including his personal safety, in order
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to prevent this tragedy from ever happening again. It is at this point that the Emperor
resolved within himself to take action to bring the war to an end.
On August 9* the Soviet Union invaded Manchuria, the United States dropped a
second atomic bomb on Nagasaki, and there were meetings of the Big Six and the
Cabinet. All of this resulted in a continuing deadlock as three of the four military
leaders argued for a continuation of the war. Since no decision could be made without
a unanimous agreement, efforts to end the war were stalled. During the afternoon, the
Foreign Minister's staff obtained the necessary petition signatures from the military
officers (under a questionable pretense) for an Imperial Conference at an unspecified
time in the future. With the national leadership at an impasse, and having previously
discussed the problem with the Emperor and finding him so heavily opposed to the
continuation of the war. Foreign Minister Togo presented the petition. The alternative
for breaking deadlocks throughout Japanese history had been to dissolve the Cabinet
and reorganize it with individuals who could resolve the issue. This was not done
because of the urgency and gravity of the situation. Instead, an Imperial Conference
was held in which the Emperor took the unprecedented step of providing his opinion
on a matter of state. His opinion was unanimously adopted and became a state
decision.
Having accepted the Emperor's opinion, Japan offered to accept the terms of the
Potsdam Proclamation if the Imperial structure were preserved. TT»e United States, in
coojjeration with the other Allies, responded with a note that fell short of the
commitment the Japanese had requested. The talks among the Big Six artd the Cabinet
members again stalled with the same three military leaders unwilling to trust the enemy
78
to preserve the ancient dynasty. This time the Emperor exercised his privilege to call
an Imperial Conference and after hearing the arguments of the military, he again
declared his desire to see the war ended and pointed out that the military had not been
keeping its commitments to prepare the homeland for its final and decisive battle.
Again his opinion was unanimously adopted and the Japanese government sent a
message accepting the terms of the Potsdam Proclamation and hoping the Allies would
preserve the Imperial household.
E. ANALOGIES
There are several analogies that can be drawn from the way the atomic bomb was
used against Japan and the potential for future use of the NRF. It must also be
pointed out that there are many differences between what happened in Japan and what
would happen in a war with the Soviet Union. There are also many cultural
differences between the two nations. Because these analogies are based on the only
case study available, the applicability to any particular situation wUl always be
somewhat questionable.
First, the NRF can, if necessary, be used to achieve political results. In Japan, the
atomic bomb was the galvanizing force which after a long and punishing war led the
Emperor to force Japan to accept surrender. Hirohito considered the bombing of
Hiroshima in addition to the previous suffering caused by four agonizing years of war
to be intolerable. At two subsequent Imperial Conferences he did what no Japanese
Emperor had ever done before. On both occasions he went beyond the ceremonial
silence or rare Imperial question and in these two instances gave his opinion. In both
cases his opinion was adopted unanimously and became a decision of the state. In the
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2,600 years of previous Imperial rule, no Emperor had ever provided his opinion or
decided matters of state. As a result of the Emperor's influence, the Japanese ceased
hostilities approximately one week after Hiroshima had been bombed. If a future war
against the United States were to occur with the same degree of national commitment
as the Japanese possessed and were equally threatening to the global security, it might
be appropriate to consider using a nuclear weapon to convince such an enemy of his
impending defeat.
Second, the atomic bombs were not used in an unrestricted massive strike. While
it is true that there were only two bombs available at that time, they were not used
together or rapidly. Instead, the bombs were used several days apart. TTie first bomb
had a much greater psychological effect on the Japanese leaders then the second bomb.
For the Emperor, who felt so heavily burdened, it was a powerful inducement to end
the war. Likewise, a rapid firing of today's NRF should be avoided but at the same
time, the first strike should be calculated to have the maximum psychological impact.
Additionally, rapid firing of the NRF should be avoided because it would deplete the
United States' arsenal. This would eliminate any incentive the Soviet Union had for
withholding their remaining arsenal which is aimed at the West.
Third, the atomic bomb was not used until after major damage had been done and
it was clear that Japan would lose. The primary reason in this case may have been
that the atomic bomb had not been developed until that point, but the intent of using
the bomb was to shock the Japanese into realizing that they had lost.'"* Along the
'"^^orton, p. 336.
80
same lines of thought then, the NRF should not be used (launched) until victory is in
sight in order to shorten the war. If it has become clear that the United States cannot
win, then the NRF may be more appropriately used as a political tool in bargaining for
acceptable surrender terms.
Fourth, psychological warfare played a key role in Japan's surrender. The leaflets
that were dropped on five Japanese cities heightened the urgency with which the peace
had to be concluded. In order to prevent a coup which would place the military in
complete control of Japan and eliminate any chance for bringing the war to a rapid
conclusion, it became necessary for the Emperor to convene an Imperial Conference
and to give his own opinion on the termination of the war to the Cabinet members.
Effective psychological warfare can also play a key role in war termination.
Finally, the atomic bomb was used only after Japan had been given an opportunity
to surrender and (were perceived to have) refiised that opportunity. This refusal was
combined with a statement which advocated complete national commitment leaving no
evidence of a "peace party" within the Japanese government. The analogy that can be
drawn, is that nuclear weapons should be used in war termination only in light of the
enemy's total commitment to continue the war, when all other means have failed.
The most basic conclusion of any study of war termination is that the new weapons
technology has called forth new theories of war. In a simpler long gone age, military
planners were content to think in terms of victory and defeat. The post modem era
has changed that. WhUe the military planner of today continues to plan for victory,
he also realizes that in light of the potential devastation, deterrence of war and its
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escalation are now factors that must be considered. He should also realize that war
termination should be the goal in any national war plan.
3.
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